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REPUDIATING DEATH
WILLIAM W. BERRY III *
In recent years, three Supreme Court Justices, Powell, Blackmun, and
Stevens, have all called for the abolition of the death penalty, repudiating
their prior approval of the use of capital punishment. This Article
conceptualizes these reversals not as normative shifts on the morality of
capital punishment, but instead as shifts in the Justices’ views concerning
their own need to exercise judicial restraint towards the states with respect
to the death penalty.
Two separate decisions comprise their abandonment of judicial
restraint. First, Justices Powell, Blackmun, and Stevens all acquiesce to
the decision of the Court to use the Eighth Amendment to regulate the
states’ administration of capital punishment. Later, each of the three
Justices separately advocates interpreting the Eighth Amendment to
prohibit the states’ use of the death penalty entirely. This Article argues
that both of these decisions to abandon deference to the states reflect, on
the part of Justices Powell, Blackmun, and Stevens, a diminishing view of
the Court’s duty to exercise judicial restraint with respect to state
legislatures and their use of the death penalty.
In addition to explaining why their respective rejections of the death
penalty were institutional (and not moral) choices, this Article argues that
these repudiations were the inevitable consequence of the initial decision to
use the Eighth Amendment to regulate the death penalty. The experience of
these Justices and the Court over the past thirty-five years demonstrates the
extreme difficulty in interpreting and applying the Eighth Amendment in a
manner that ensures that states’ administration of the death penalty is fair
and non-arbitrary. When one premises his support of capital punishment
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upon the notion that the application of the Eighth Amendment can achieve
these goals, as Justices Powell, Blackmun, and Stevens did, the futility of
trying to correct the myriad of problems with the states’ use of the death
penalty leads to the conclusion that no fruitful remedy exists other than
abolishing capital punishment.
I. INTRODUCTION
“In order to learn, one must change one’s mind.”
—Orson Scott Card

It is a rare occurrence for a Supreme Court Justice to reverse his or her
stance on a particular issue. And yet, that is what has happened with three
Justices’ views as to the use of capital punishment in the United States. All
three had voted to uphold capital punishment as constitutional under the
Eighth Amendment beginning in the 1970s, and one by one, most recently
in 2008, each concluded that capital punishment should be abolished after
twenty years of deciding capital cases on the United States Supreme Court.1
First, there was the repudiation of the use of the death penalty by
Justice Lewis Powell, who dissented in Furman v. Georgia,2 voted with the
three-Justice plurality in Gregg v. Georgia, 3 and authored the majority
opinion in McCleskey v. Kemp. 4 During a conversation with his former law
clerk John Jeffries in the summer of 1991, retired Justice Powell was asked
whether he would change his vote in any prior case.5 Their conversation
went as follows:
“Yes, McCleskey v. Kemp.”

1

6

As explained below, both Justices Blackmun and Powell initially rejected the
application of the Eighth Amendment to capital punishment in 1972, and Justice Stevens
voted to uphold the constitutionality of the death penalty in 1976. Justice Powell rejected
use of the death penalty in its entirety after his retirement in 1991, Justice Blackmun rejected
it in 1994, and Justice Stevens rejected it in 2008.
2
408 U.S. 238 (1972). Furman held that the death penalty violated the Eighth
Amendment because its application was so arbitrary as to constitute “cruel and unusual”
punishment, temporarily abolishing its use in the United States. See discussion infra Parts II
and III.
3
428 U.S. 153 (1976). Gregg held that punishment of death for the crime of murder did
not, under all circumstances, violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, reinstating the
use of the death penalty. See discussion infra Parts II and III.
4
481 U.S. 279 (1987). McCleskey upheld the death penalty even though social science
studies demonstrated racial bias in the administration of the death penalty, namely based on
the race of the victim. Id. at 313.
5
This conversation was recorded for a biography of Justice Powell that Jeffries wrote.
See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 451 (1994).
6
Ironically, McCleskey had only been decided four years prior (in 1987) to Justice
Powell’s repudiation of capital punishment. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 279.
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“Do you mean you would now accept the argument from statistics?”
“No, I would vote the other way in any capital case.”
“In any capital case?”
“Yes.”
“Even in Furman v. Georgia?”
7
“Yes. I have come to think that capital punishment should be abolished.”

Justice Harry Blackmun followed in Justice Powell’s footsteps in
1994, when he likewise concluded that the death penalty should be
abolished. Like Justice Powell, Justice Blackmun had been a dissenter in
Furman 8 and concurred in Gregg. 9 Just weeks before he retired from the
Supreme Court in 1994, Justice Blackmun dissented to the denial of
certiorari in Callins v. Collins, and in doing so, wrote:
From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death. For more
than 20 years I have endeavored—indeed, I have struggled—along with a majority of
this Court, to develop procedural and substantive rules that would lend more than the
mere appearance of fairness to the death penalty endeavor. Rather than continue to
coddle the Court’s delusion that the desired level of fairness has been achieved and
the need for regulation eviscerated, I feel morally and intellectually obligated simply
to concede that the death penalty experiment has failed. It is virtually self-evident to
me now that no combination of procedural rules or substantive regulations ever can
save the death penalty from its inherent constitutional deficiencies. The basic
question—does the system accurately and consistently determine which defendants
10
“deserve” to die?—cannot be answered in the affirmative.

As with Justices Powell and Blackmun, Justice John Paul Stevens
reached the conclusion that the death penalty should be abolished. Justice
Stevens was not on the Court at the time of Furman, but joined with Justice
Powell in the three-Justice plurality that wrote Gregg. 11 Nonetheless, in
Baze v. Rees, 12 decided in June 2008, Justice Stevens wrote the following in
his concurrence:
In sum, just as Justice White ultimately based his conclusion in Furman on his
extensive exposure to countless cases for which death is the authorized penalty, I have
relied on my own experience in reaching the conclusion that the imposition of the
death penalty represents “the pointless and needless extinction of life with only
marginal contributions to any discernible social or public purposes.” A penalty with

7

See JEFFRIES, supra note 5, at 451.
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
9
Interestingly, both Justices Blackmun and Stevens dissented from Justice Powell’s
opinion in McCleskey. See discussions infra subparts III.A. and III.B.
10
Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145–46 (1994) (dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (citation omitted).
11
See supra note 3.
12
128 S.Ct. 1520 (2008). The Court in Baze held that the risk of improper
administration of the first drug did not render the three-drug protocol cruel and unusual
under the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution. Id.
8
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such negligible returns to the State [is] patently excessive and cruel and unusual
13
punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment.

It is clear that Justices Powell, Blackmun, and Stevens believe that the
Furman experiment—that is, the Court’s attempt, beginning in Gregg, to
remedy the constitutional flaws of capital punishment—has failed. But,
there has been no systematic attempt to explore how and why each Justice
reached the same conclusion and the degree to which these rationales relate
to each other. This Article attempts to fill that void in several ways.
First, this Article conceptualizes these reversals not as normative shifts
on the morality of capital punishment, but instead as shifts in the Justices’
views concerning judicial restraint towards the states with respect to the
death penalty. 14
Two separate decisions comprise the Justices’ abandonment of judicial
restraint. Justices Powell, Blackmun, and Stevens first all acquiesce to the
decision of the Court to use the Eighth Amendment to regulate the states’
administration of capital punishment. Later, each of the three Justices
separately advocates interpreting the Eighth Amendment to prohibit the
states’ use of the death penalty entirely. This Article argues that both of
these decisions to abandon deference to the states reflect, on the part of
Justices Powell, Blackmun, and Stevens, a diminishing view of the Court’s
duty to exercise judicial restraint with respect to state legislatures and their
use of the death penalty.
In addition to explaining why their respective rejections of the death
penalty were institutional (and not moral) choices, the Article argues that
these repudiations were the inevitable consequence of the initial decision to
use the Eighth Amendment to regulate the death penalty. The experience of
these Justices and the Court over the past thirty-five years demonstrates the
extreme difficulty in interpreting and applying the Eighth Amendment in a
manner that ensures that states’ administration of the death penalty is fair
and non-arbitrary. When one premises his support of capital punishment
upon the notion that the application of the Eighth Amendment can achieve
these goals, as Justices Powell, Blackmun, and Stevens did, the futility of
trying to correct the myriad of problems with the states’ use of the death
penalty leads to the conclusion that no fruitful remedy exists other than
abolishing capital punishment.

13

Id. at 1551.
See infra Part II. As explained in Part II, “judicial restraint” refers to the role of the
Court in interpreting the constitution and the degree to which it defers to state legislative
action. Here, in the capital context, the three Justices slowly abandoned their initial
deferential approaches, finding the Constitution to apply to, regulate, and ultimately forbid
the use of capital punishment.
14
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Part II of the Article outlines the Court’s doctrines of judicial restraint
and frames the two separate decisions to abandon judicial restraint in the
context of the Eighth Amendment. Part III traces the two shifts in each
Justice’s conception of judicial restraint: (1) the shift from a view of
complete deference to the states’ use of the death penalty to one of
regulating its use, and (2) the shift from regulating the states’ use of the
death penalty to a view that the Court should abolish the use of the death
penalty by the states altogether. Finally, Part IV explains why the
conclusion that the death penalty should be abolished was an inevitable
consequence of the Justices’ initial decision to constitutionalize the death
penalty.
II. JUDICIAL RESTRAINT IN CAPITAL CASES
“For nowadays, restraint gets you friends, honesty gets you hated.”
—Terence

A. THE PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL RESTRAINT

Since Marbury v. Madison 15 established that the Supreme Court had
the primary responsibility of interpreting the Constitution, the Court has
grappled with the concept of judicial restraint. 16 The Court has been
15

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). The scholarship on the role of the Supreme Court with
respect to state legislatures is an extensive body of literature, as is the scholarship addressing
the various competing methods of constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington
& Roger C. Crampton, Judicial Independence In Excess: Reviving The Judicial Duty Of The
Supreme Court, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 587 (2009); Alan C. Michaels, Constitutional
Innocence, 112 HARV. L. REV. 828 (1999); Benjamin C. Mizer, The Bureaucratic Court, 105
MICH. L. REV. 1301 (2006); see also Bruce G. Peabody, Congressional Constitutional
Interpretation and the Courts: A Preliminary Inquiry into Legislative Attitudes, 1959–2001,
29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 127 (2004); David A.J. Richards, Originalism Without
Foundations, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1373 (1990); Willard C. Shih, Assisted Suicide, the Due
Process Clause and “Fidelity In Translation,” 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1245 (1995).
16
For purposes of this Article, the concept of “judicial restraint” is limited to the ways in
which Justices Powell, Blackmun, and Stevens refer to it in the Eighth Amendment context.
See discussion infra in Part III. It is worth noting that the use of the phrases “judicial
activism” and “judicial restraint,” have been used in a variety of different ways. Indeed,
judicial restraint has been characterized as a “contestable concept open to a variety of
definitions.” Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis, and the Promotion of Judicial
Restraint, 22 CONST. COMMENT 271, 274 (2005); see also Matthew J. Franck, Depends on
What the Meaning of Judicial Activism Is, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Sept. 13, 2006),
http://nationalreview.com/search/ (search for “Matthew Franck” under date 9/13/06)
(arguing that activism can be pretty neutrally defined as the wrongful use of power we call
judicial review). Some have tried to resuscitate these terms by defining their various
meanings, see Keenan Kmiec, The Origin and Current Meanings of Judicial Activism, 92
CALIF. L. REV. 1441 (2004) (describing the various derogatory connotations of “judicial
activism,” all of which involve judges improperly usurping power properly belonging to
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hesitant, in theory, to interpret the Constitution in such a way as to
substitute its own judgment for that of the state legislatures or the Congress,
particularly when applying open-ended and ambiguous constitutional
language. 17 In its cases, the Court has articulated several canons of
interpretation that counsel against both constitutionalizing an issue in the
first place and against deciding constitutional questions unless it is
absolutely necessary to do so. 18
Thus, despite the presence of the Supremacy Clause and the holding of
Marbury, the Supreme Court has placed value on the concept of judicial
restraint in its application of the Constitution to state and federal statutes.19
Justice Black perhaps best summarized this sentiment in his Griswold v.
Connecticut dissent:
While I completely subscribe to the holding of Marbury v. Madison and subsequent
cases, that our Court has constitutional power to strike down statutes, state or federal,
that violate commands of the Federal Constitution, I do not believe that we are
granted power by the Due Process Clause or any other constitutional provision or
provisions to measure constitutionality by our belief that legislation is arbitrary,
capricious or unreasonable, or accomplishes no justifiable purpose, or is offensive to
20
our own notions of “civilized standards of conduct.”

In other words, at least for purposes of this Article, judicial restraint
means interpreting the Constitution in such a way so as not to prohibit the
exercise of power by state legislatures unless such an exercise clearly
contravenes the Constitution. 21 Accordingly, this Article considers judicial

other democratic entities, and trying to propose a series of different types of “activism” to
give the term meaning), or trying to distinguish between various types of activism, see
Caprice Roberts, In Search of Judicial Activism: Dangers in Quantifying the Qualitative, 74
TENN. L. REV. 567 (2007); see also Lori A. Ringhand, The Rehnquist Court: A “By The
Numbers” Retrospective, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1033 (2007) (using a statistical analysis to
argue that the Rehnquist Court was more activist than its predecessors).
17
In practice, of course, the Court often applies the Constitution in such a way as to
usurp power from the states or the Congress in the name of applying the Constitution, but its
opinions nonetheless often discuss the value of the Court exercising restraint.
18
See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
19
U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
20
381 U.S. 479, 513 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
21
Judicial restraint as it is used here can encompass (but does not have to) various
methods constitutional interpretation, including interpreting the constitution with fidelity to
the “original” meaning of the Constitution (“originalism”), with fidelity to the “plain”
meaning of the text of the Constitution (“textualism”), and interpreting the Constitution
consistent with prior interpretations by the Court (“stare decisis”). See, e.g., Andrew M.
Jacobs, God Save This Postmodern Court: The Death of Necessity and the Transformation of
the Supreme Court’s Overruling Rhetoric, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1119, 1178 n.320 (1995);
Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 52
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restraint in the manner that Powell, Blackmun, and Stevens do in the capital
context—only with reference to either the decision to use the Constitution
to regulate the exercise of power by state legislatures or the decision to
prohibit such an exercise altogether. 22
Further, the concept of judicial restraint requires the Justices to put
aside their own political views when assessing the constitutionality of a
state statute. The concern, of course, is that Justices will use various
constitutional interpretive methods as a pretext for overriding the will of the
majority, as expressed through the state legislatures, where the Justice has a
philosophical or moral (as opposed to constitutional) problem with the
statute. 23
B. JUDICIAL RESTRAINT AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT:
AN OVERVIEW

In the Eighth Amendment context, the concept of judicial restraint as
herein construed refers to two thresholds. The first is the decision to
constitutionalize the death penalty in the first place, and make its use by the
states subject to constitutional restrictions (as interpreted by the Court). In
other words, the first opportunity for the Justices to restrain themselves is to
avoid applying the Eighth Amendment to capital punishment at all, and
allow state legislatures alone to regulate its use (and choose to allow or
disallow it) entirely. 24

(2001) (noting that “if one believes in the determinacy of the underlying legal texts” then
judicial restraint may mean “fidelity to the texts themselves”).
22
Thus, this Article does not consider the use of judicial restraint in the context of the
Court’s restrictions on Congressional or federal executive power.
23
There is no dearth of modern constitutional law scholarship that attempts to address
the countermajoritarian difficulty, that is, to explain why, notwithstanding our commitment
to rule by the people, it is permissible for judges to be innovators in matters of social policy.
See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE BAR ON POLITICS 17–20 (Yale University Press 1986) (1962); JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) (seeking to explain how the innovations of the Warren
Court were consistent with a basic commitment to democracy). For an historical
perspective, see Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part
One: The Road To Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333 (1998); Barry Friedman, The
History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part II: Reconstruction’s Political Court, 91
GEO. L.J. 1 (2002); Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part
Three: The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383 (2001); Barry Friedman, The History
of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law’s Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971
(2000); Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L. J. 153 (2002).
24
Indeed, prior to Furman v. Georgia, this had been the Court’s practice for almost two
hundred years, as it had never considered the constitutionality of the death penalty under the
Eighth Amendment.
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Once this first threshold of restraint is crossed and the Court decides to
apply the Eighth Amendment to capital punishment, the Court is in the
position of regulating its use under the Eighth Amendment, applying the
open-ended concept of “cruel and unusual punishment” to determine which
capital practices are permissible and which are unconstitutional. 25
The second threshold is the decision to prohibit the use of the death
penalty altogether. The exercise of restraint here would be to allow the
states to continue to modify their capital punishment schemes and statutes
to comply with the requirements of the Eighth Amendment. 26 The decision
to cross the second threshold means deciding that the states no longer can
use the death penalty.
While there are varying levels of restraint in between these two
thresholds, the concept of judicial restraint here refers primarily to the
decision to cross each of these thresholds.
This Article thus is
conceptualizing the parallel decisions of Justices Powell, Blackmun, and
Stevens to cross these two thresholds and abandon their prior positions of
restraint as to each one.
As explained in more detail below, the use of the concept of judicial
restraint by Justices Powell and Blackmun, and later Justice Stevens, as a
reason for not crossing each of these thresholds serves as the source of this
conceptualization. Indeed, the Justices (at least Powell and Blackmun) 27
initially believed that the Court should not cross the first threshold, that is,
apply the Constitution to the death penalty at all. 28 Over time, however,
each of the three Justices has advocated crossing not only the first, but also
the second threshold by holding that the Constitution bars the use of the
death penalty entirely. 29

25

See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
Interestingly, many believed at the time that it was decided that Furman v. Georgia
crossed both thresholds in its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, but the Court proved
otherwise in Gregg v. Georgia four years later. See Corinna Barrett Lain, Furman
Fundamentals, 82 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2007).
27
Justice Stevens was not yet on the Court at that time. Based on his initial decisions
when he first was appointed to the Court, however, one can infer that he would have held
similar initial views to those of Justice Blackmun and Justice Powell. See infra subpart
III.C.
28
See infra Part III.
29
Id.
26
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III. THE ABANDONMENT OF JUDICIAL RESTRAINT
“When you have faults, do not fear to abandon them.”
—Confucius

Before exploring the evolving positions of each of the three Justices on
matters related to capital punishment, it is important to note that none of the
three has ever based their holdings in capital cases on normative (moral or
philosophical) grounds. Unlike Justices Brennan and Marshall on the left,
or Justices Rehnquist and Burger on the right, these three Justices have
sought to apply the constitutionality of capital punishment not on
ideological grounds but instead on pragmatic ones.30 Indeed, the question
for them is not whether capital punishment ought to be applied in the
philosophical sense, but instead whether it can be applied even-handedly
and if so, how the criminal justice system should be structured, including
adding necessary safeguards, to insure that the process is equitable. 31 As
we will see, it is in part the absence of a broader ideological, normative
commitment to the death penalty on the part of Justices Powell, Blackmun,
and Stevens that ultimately provides the freedom to change their respective
views.
From the ratification of the Constitution in 1791 until the 1960s, the
constitutionality of capital punishment in the United States was never
addressed by the Supreme Court. 32 This is unsurprising as the use of capital
punishment was widespread in the United States in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries.33 Further, the plain language of the Constitution
seemed to presume that capital punishment would be used. The Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that:

30

See discussion, infra, subparts III.A, III.B, and III.C.
I have argued elsewhere that the perception of the equity and fairness of capital
procedures plays a significant role in the degree to which the death penalty is actually
utilized in the United States.
See William W. Berry III, American Procedural
Exceptionalism, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 481 (2008).
32
See John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of ‘Unusual’: The Eighth Amendment
as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739 (2008); see also Anthony F.
Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:” The Original Meaning, 57
CALIF. L. REV. 839, 840 (1969) (arguing “cruel and unusual” was a kind of “constitutional
‘boilerplate’”).
33
See J. Caleb Rackley, Legal Ethics in Capital Cases: Looking for Virtue in Roberts v.
Dretke and Assessing the Ethical Implications of the Death Row Volunteer, 36 ST. MARY’S
L.J. 1119 (2005); Joanna M. Shepherd, Murders of Passion, Execution Delays and the
Deterrence of Capital Punishment, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 283 (2004); Franklin E. Zimring, The
Unexamined Death Penalty: Capital Punishment and Reform of the Model Penal Code, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 1396 (2005).
31
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No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime. . . nor
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
34
limb. . . nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . .

Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment, in adopting the due process
language of the Fifth Amendment, provides: “[N]or shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”35
These constitutional provisions plainly allow for the possibility that
federal and state governments may choose to use capital punishment; some
crimes will be “capital” and the government, whether state or federal, may
deprive its citizens of life after according them the requisite due process of
law. It does not address the degree to which the Constitution may be used,
if at all, to regulate the use of capital punishment, but instead merely
implies the potential availability of the death penalty.
In the landmark case of Furman v. Georgia, the United States Supreme
Court held five to four that the death penalty, as applied by the various
states, constituted “cruel and unusual” punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. 36 As discussed below, Justices Powell and Blackmun both
dissented from the majority opinion largely on grounds of judicial
restraint—that is, neither believed that the problems identified with the
capital system in Georgia were significant enough to permit the Justices to
interpret the Constitution to prohibit the death penalty. 37 Justice Powell
found that the references to capital punishment in the text of the
Constitution, 38 the intent of the Framers, and the precedents of the Court all
cautioned against interpreting the Eighth Amendment in a way that
precluded the use of the death penalty. 39 Justice Blackmun cited these same
reasons as the basis for exercising judicial restraint (and preserving the role
of state legislatures) in deciding how and when to use the death penalty. 40
He underscored the importance of such restraint with his own admission
that if he were a legislator, he would vote against capital punishment. 41
When the Supreme Court reinstated the death penalty in Gregg v.
Georgia, Justice Stevens joined Justices Powell and Stewart as the

34

U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (emphasis added).
36
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
37
Id. at 464 (Powell, J., dissenting). As mentioned above, Justice Stevens was not yet a
member of the Supreme Court.
38
Id. at 417–20.
39
Id. at 431.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 406 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
35
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triumvirate that wrote the controlling plurality opinion. 42 Their language in
Gregg made clear that the principle of judicial restraint remained a
significant consideration in the application of the Eighth Amendment to
state statutes:
Of course, the requirements of the Eighth Amendment must be applied with an
awareness of the limited role to be played by the courts. This does not mean that
judges have no role to play, for the Eighth Amendment is a restraint upon the exercise
of legislative power . . . . But, while we have an obligation to insure that
constitutional bounds are not overreached, we may not act as judges as we might as
legislators . . . . Courts are not representative bodies. They are not designed to be a
good reflex of a democratic society. Their judgment is best informed, and therefore
most dependable, within narrow limits. Their essential quality is detachment, founded
on independence. History teaches that the independence of the judiciary is
jeopardized when courts become embroiled in the passions of the day and assume
primary responsibility in choosing between competing political, economic and social
43
pressures.

Justices Stevens, Powell, and Stewart concluded that “in assessing a
punishment selected by a democratically elected legislature against the
constitutional measure, we presume its validity . . . . [A] heavy burden rests
on those who would attack the judgment of the representatives of the
people.” 44 Thus, in the context of capital punishment, the Court in Gregg
concluded that its role in applying the Eighth Amendment was one of
deference to the state legislatures, with certain limitations. 45
The Court’s role, then, in applying the Eighth Amendment was one of
restraint, in which states could remedy their constitutional defects and
legislative actions, and for the most part be respected. How then did
Justices Powell, Blackmun, and Stevens all conclude that the Court should
relinquish this position and ban capital punishment? As the cases
demonstrate, each Justice’s fidelity to the concept of judicial restraint began
to wane over time as their confidence in the ability of the states to carry out
capital trials in a fair and non-arbitrary way began to dissipate.

42
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Justice Blackmun adhered to his Furman
position that the Court should not interfere with the ability of states to use the death penalty,
and thus concurred in the decision of the Court in Gregg. Id.
43
Id. at 174–75.
44
Id. at 175.
45
These of course included the provision of safeguards such as aggravating and
mitigating circumstances, proportionality review by state supreme courts, bifurcated trials,
and a prohibition against the use of the mandatory death penalty. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
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A. JUSTICE POWELL

1. Deferring to Death
Unlike some of his colleagues, 46 Justice Lewis Powell did not seek to
advance a normative position in favor of or against the death penalty. 47
Indeed, in his career before becoming a Justice, Powell felt that “the low
numbers of people even sentenced to death were proof that [capital
punishment] was not an issue of ‘first importance.’” 48 When faced with the
issue in McGautha and Furman, Justice Powell approached the
constitutionality of capital punishment as a pragmatist who prided himself
on judicial restraint, particularly in encroaching on the powers conferred
upon state and federal legislatures. 49 As one of the four dissenters in
Furman, Justice Powell found no basis for finding the death penalty
unconstitutional. 50 Writing separately, Justice Powell emphasized that
“whatever punishments the Framers of the Constitution may have intended
to prohibit under the ‘cruel and unusual’ language, there cannot be the
slightest doubt that they intended no absolute bar on the Government’s
authority to impose the death penalty.”51 Specifically, Justice Powell wrote
that “the Court is not free to read into the Constitution a meaning that is
plainly at variance with its language. Both the language of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments and the history of the Eighth Amendment confirm
beyond doubt that the death penalty was considered to be a constitutionally

46

Indeed, Jeffries writes, “On Powell’s first day on the Court, [Justice] Marshall joked,
‘Do you have your capital punishment opinion written yet?’” JEFFRIES, supra note 5, at 408;
see also BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME
COURT 205 (1979) (reporting the same exchange).
47
As previously stated, Justice Powell reserved his decision on capital punishment to the
Constitution and restraint to state legislators,
Not only had [Justice Powell] not written an opinion; he actually did not have one. He had never
been involved in a capital case and had never really thought about the issue . . . [i]n truth, Powell
was neither enthusiastically for nor categorically against capital punishment. He instinctively
recoiled from extreme positions, particularly those nonnegotiable ideological commitments that
left not room for compromise or debate. This was especially true of capital punishment . . . .
Powell not only rejected the extremes on either side; he shied away from the debate they
dominated. Spared by experience from the necessity of coming to grips with capital punishment
and temperamentally disinclined to enter a question so rife with rage and conflict, Powell came
to the Court without a fixed view.

JEFFRIES, supra note 5, at 408–09.
48
Id.
49
Id.; see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); McGautha v. California, 402
U.S. 183 (1971).
50
Id.
51
Furman, 408 U.S.at 419 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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permissible punishment.” 52 Further, given the principle of stare decisis,
Justice Powell opposed the abolition of the death penalty in Furman
because “those who today would have this Court undertake the absolute
abolition of the death penalty also must reject the opinions of other cases
stipulating or assuming the constitutionality of capital punishment.” 53
While Justice Powell was certainly not oblivious to the concerns of the
majority relating to the use of the death penalty in Furman, he nonetheless
believed that such concerns did not warrant abolition.54 He explained that
“[w]hile there might be specific cases in which capital punishment would
be regarded as excessive and shocking to the conscience of the community,
it can hardly be argued that the public’s dissatisfaction with the penalty in
particular cases would translate into a demand for absolute abolition.” 55
Even though “this criminal sanction [the death penalty] falls more heavily
on the relatively impoverished and underprivileged elements of society,”
Justice Powell rationalized that “[t]he ‘have-nots’ in every society always
have been subject to greater pressure to commit crimes and to fewer
constraints than their more affluent fellow citizens.”56 For Justice Powell,
“[t]his is, indeed, a tragic byproduct of social and economic deprivation, but
it is not an argument of constitutional proportions under the Eighth or
Fourteenth Amendment.” 57 And, “[t]he same discriminatory impact
argument could be made with equal force and logic with respect to those
sentenced to prison terms.” 58
In particular, Justice Powell emphasized the importance of restraint on
issues such as substantive due process and capital punishment to state
legislatures. He then chastised the majority’s decision for overreaching in
its use of authority. He wrote that the majority’s ruling was “the very sort
of judgment that the legislative branch is competent to make and for which
the judiciary is ill-equipped.” 59 Justice Powell concluded, “the indicators
most likely to reflect the public’s view—legislative bodies, state referenda,
and the juries which have the actual responsibility—do not support the
contention that evolving standards of decency require total abolition of

52

Id. at 420.
Id. at 424.
54
Id. Indeed, he recognized the problems identified by the majority, but did not find
those to be significant enough to warrant “constitutional” intervention by the Court. Id.
55
Id. at 445.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 447.
59
Id. at 418.
53
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capital punishment . . . .” and that “[t]he assessment of popular opinion is
essentially a legislative, not a judicial function.” 60
This second threshold to cross (in abolition via the Constitution) is
important precisely because of its apparent permanency (notwithstanding
the Court reversing itself). In other words, once the Court decides that the
Constitution bars certain action by state legislatures, there is no opportunity
for the state legislatures to cure any constitutional defects of such an action
without the Court reversing or modifying its application of the Constitution.
Justice Powell clearly grasped this, as he explained in his Furman dissent:
It is important to keep in focus the enormity of the step undertaken by the Court
today. Not only does it invalidate hundreds of state and federal laws, it deprives those
jurisdictions of the power to legislate with respect to capital punishment in the future,
except in the manner consistent with the cloudily outlined views of those Justices who
do not purport to undertake total abolition . . . .
It seems to me that the sweeping judicial action undertaken today reflects a basic lack
of faith and confidence in the democratic process. Many may regret, as I do, the
failure of some legislative bodies to address the capital punishment issue with greater
frankness or effectiveness. Many might decry their failure either to abolish the
penalty entirely or selectively, or to establish standards for its enforcement. But
impatience with the slowness, or even unresponsiveness, of legislatures is no
61
justification for judicial intrusion upon their historic powers.

In Gregg and its companion cases decided the same day, Justice
Powell was part of the three-Justice plurality (with Justices Stevens and
Stewart) that wrote the controlling opinions in the cases. 62 As described
above, the plurality reinstated the death penalty under the Eighth
Amendment in Gregg, finding that while the Court could place restrictions
on the use of capital punishment, the revised Georgia scheme provided
enough safeguards to cure its prior constitutional defects.63 Similarly, in
Proffitt v. Florida, a Powell plurality upheld the Florida capital system on
similar grounds to Gregg. 64 After the Florida legislature’s adoption of the
60

Id. at 442–43.
Id. at 461–65.
62
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); see Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976);
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). These cases were decided a mere four years after
Furman v. Georgia.
63
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198.
64
Proffitt, 428 U.S. 242. As the Court explained, the basic difference between the
Florida system and the Georgia system was that, in Florida, the sentence was determined by
the trial judge rather than by the jury, which did not create a constitutional problem. Id. at
252. It continued: “it would appear that judicial sentencing should lead, if anything, to even
greater consistency in the imposition at the trial court level of capital punishment, since a
trial judge is more experienced in sentencing than a jury, and therefore is better able to
impose sentences similar to those imposed in analogous cases.” Id.
61
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new capital scheme, the Court indicated that it was constitutional because it
was no longer true that there was “no meaningful basis for distinguishing
the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases
in which it is not.” 65 Likewise, in Jurek v. Texas, the Court upheld the
Texas capital scheme because it provided, at least in theory, a way to
narrow the class of murderers for whom the death penalty is available.66
Justice Powell’s decisions in Gregg and its companion cases were an
abandonment of his Furman position insofar as he agreed to go along with
the Court’s decision to constitutionalize capital punishment. 67 This shift in
Justice Powell, crossing the threshold that the Supreme Court could now
regulate capital punishment, is evident from his votes in these cases as part
of the three-Justice plurality that wrote the controlling opinions.
Equally important, these cases defined when the Court should
intervene and the basis for it doing so. As explained by Justices Stewart,
Stevens, and Powell in Woodson v. North Carolina, 68 “[t]he Eighth
Amendment stands to assure that the State’s power to punish is ‘exercised
within the limits of civilized standards.’” 69 As a result, “[c]entral to the
application of the Eighth Amendment is a determination of contemporary
standards regarding the infliction of punishment . . . .” 70 Further, “[t]he two
crucial indicators of evolving standards of decency respecting the
imposition of punishment in our society. . . [are] jury determinations and
legislative enactments . . . .” 71
In other words, the initial justification for crossing the first threshold
of judicial restraint, and thereby ending the complete autonomy of the state
65

Id. at 254.
Jurek, 428 U.S. 268–71. To obtain a death sentence in Texas, the State is required to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that “there is a probability that the defendant would
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.” Id. at
269.
67
By contrast, Justice Blackmun remained firm to his Furman view that the Court ought
not to use the Eighth Amendment to regulate the states’ administration of the death penalty.
Id. at 279 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See discussion infra, subpart III.B.
68
428 U.S. 280 (1976). In Woodson, the plurality of Justices Powell, Stevens, and
Stewart voted to strike down the legislative scheme in North Carolina that provided for a
mandatory death sentence for murder.
69
Id. at 288 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)).
70
Id. at 280. The concept of “evolving standards of decency” came from Trop, a noncapital case where the Court held that a penalty of loss of citizenship for desertion was
unconstitutional—a “cruel and unusual” punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Trop, 356 U.S. at 103. For a discussion of the inherent weaknesses with the “evolving
standards of decency” doctrine, see William W. Berry III, Following the Yellow Brick Road
of Evolving Standards of Decency: The Ironic Consequences of “Death is Different”
Jurisprudence, 28 PACE L. REV. 15 (2007).
71
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 293.
66
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legislatures, was the availability of proxies for public opinion.72 As a result,
it was acceptable to abandon judicial restraint and regulate the use of capital
punishment if the primary reason for regulation was majoritarian opinion
vis-à-vis the juries or the legislatures themselves.
Thus, Justice Powell crossed the threshold of constitutionalizing
capital punishment, but did so where the assessment of state statutes rested
on the consensus among state legislatures and juries. The Court tempered
the judicial restraint lost by declaring one state’s capital statutory scheme
unconstitutional by the imputation of the practices of a majority of other
states. 73 The Court then was not substituting its political judgment for that
of the states; rather, it was using the Constitution, via the evolving
standards of decency, to eliminate “outliers.”74
In Woodson, the Court relied on the practices of other states to justify
its declaration that the mandatory death penalty was unconstitutional.75 It
explained that
legislative measures adopted by the people’s chosen representatives weigh heavily in
ascertaining contemporary standards of decency. The consistent course charted by the
state legislatures and by Congress since the middle of the past century demonstrates
that the aversion of jurors to mandatory death penalty statutes is shared by society at
76
large.

72

Interestingly, the Court began to slide away from this one year later in Coker v.
Georgia, when it emphasized that the Court’s “own judgment will be brought to bear on the
question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment.” 433 U.S.
584, 598 (1977).
73
See Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren
Court’s Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361 (2004).
74
Ultimately, this leads to a practice of counting states to determine what the
contemporary standard of decency is. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)
(holding executions of people under the age of eighteen at the time the crime is committed is
“cruel and unusual” punishment under the Eighth Amendment); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304 (2002) (holding executions of mentally retarded people constitute “cruel and unusual”
punishment under the Eighth Amendment). This approach has been harshly criticized by
others on the Court. See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 337–38 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today’s
decision is the pinnacle of our Eighth Amendment death-is-different jurisprudence. Not only
does it, like all of that jurisprudence, find no support in the text or history of the Eighth
Amendment; it does not even have support in current social attitudes regarding the
conditions that render an otherwise just death penalty inappropriate. Seldom has an opinion
of this Court rested so obviously upon nothing but the personal views of its Members.”)
75
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 298. Part of this inquiry also includes surveying the historical
practices in assessing “contemporary standards.” In Woodson, for instance, the Court
explained that “[t]he history of mandatory death penalty statutes in the United States thus
reveals that the practice of sentencing to death all persons convicted of a particular offense
has been rejected as unduly harsh and unworkably rigid.” Id. at 292–93.
76
Id. at 294–95. Similarly, the Court held that Louisiana’s mandatory death penalty
statute was unconstitutional. Roberts v. Louisana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
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Finally, it is worth noting that the Powell plurality also adopted
additional guiding principles as to the constitutionality of state capital
statutes under the Eighth Amendment. 77 The Court established these limits
not from any objective study of state legislatures, but instead from its own
subjective determinations. 78
First, the Court found the mandatory death penalty statute
unconstitutional because it was likely to encourage juries to act lawlessly. 79
As a result, “it does not fulfill Furman’s basic requirement by replacing
arbitrary and wanton jury discretion with objective standards to guide,
regularize, and make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a
sentence of death.” 80
Second, and more importantly, Woodson articulated the requirement
that the particularized aspects of a defendant’s case be considered at
sentencing such that an individualized determination is made. 81 Statutory
schemes thus must allow the consideration of the facts and circumstances
surrounding the individual defendant. 82
2. Regulating Death
The Court embarked on the process of regulating the use of the death
penalty among the various states by using evolving standards of decency
and the contemporary state legislative trend, combined with its own
judgment. In such cases, Justice Powell voted on several occasions to
restrict certain state practices, but all within the broader shadow of the
consensus of the other states. 83 Even on such occasions, however, he was
77

Woodson, 428 U.S. at 293.
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 303.
81
Id.
82
This principle was extended to prevent states from limiting the mitigating evidence
that a defendant could put on at sentencing. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978)
(striking down Ohio’s statute for failure to allow defendant unfettered ability to put on
mitigating evidence as required by Woodson’s holding that each defendant is entitled to an
individualized determination).
83
This is not surprising as Justice Powell was known for being hesitant about the Court
usurping power on social issues. As explained by Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson:
78

Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the Powellian approach, however, is its emphasis on the
judicial role in facilitating the development of consensus over potentially divisive social issues.
Our history is, unfortunately, replete with judicial attempts to preempt social conflict through
constitutional decree—attempts that have all too often aggravated such conflict rather than
ameliorated it. The Powell approach sought to ensure that the most volatile issues in our society
did not quickly achieve definitive outcomes in the courts. He wished both to leave open the
channels of judicial debate and to ensure that the “losers” in court (if they so recognized
themselves) took not to the streets but rather to the voting booths and to the legislatures.
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hesitant to restrict, any more than necessary, the states’ legislative freedom
in establishing their capital systems. 84
In Coker v. Georgia, for instance, while agreeing that the death penalty
was a disproportionate punishment for the rape committed in the instant
case, Justice Powell concurred to express his view that the Court should not
foreclose the death penalty for rape in all cases.85 Citing the majority
opinion as one that “ranges well beyond what is necessary” and noting that
aggravated rape was not before the Court, Justice Powell argued that it was
“therefore quite unnecessary for the plurality to write in terms so sweeping
as to foreclose each of the 50 state legislatures from creating a narrowly
defined substantive crime of aggravated rape punishable by death.”86
Justice Powell thus believed that:
[f]inal resolution of the question [of whether the death penalty was a disproportionate
punishment for aggravated rape] must await careful inquiry into objective indicators
of society’s “evolving standards of decency,” particularly legislative enactments and
87
the responses of juries in capital cases.

While acknowledging that the plurality did engage in such an analysis
(finding that almost every state had abolished the death penalty for rape),
Justice Powell demonstrated his belief in restraint by emphasizing that
it has not been shown that society finds the penalty disproportionate for all rapes. In a
proper case a more discriminating inquiry than the plurality undertakes well might
discover that both juries and legislatures have reserved the ultimate penalty for the
case of an outrageous rape resulting in serious, lasting harm to the victim. I would not
88
prejudge the issue.

While Justice Powell generally agreed with the Court’s application of
the evolving standards in cases after Coker, he gave no indication that he
would ultimately cross the second threshold described above. If anything,
the cases toward the end of his tenure would have cautioned against any
prediction that he would advocate the abolition of the death penalty by the
Court and abandon entirely restraint and deference to state legislatures. No

J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Powellian Virtues in a Polarized Era, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
271, 273 (1992).
84
See, e.g., Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) (holding that the introduction of
victim impact statement at sentencing phase of capital murder trial violated the Eighth
Amendment, and Maryland statute was invalid to the extent it permitted consideration of that
information); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding that a sentence of death for
the crime of rape of an adult women was disproportionate to the crime and thus in violation
of the Eighth Amendment).
85
Coker, 433 U.S. 584, 601–04 (Powell, J., concurring).
86
Id. at 601–02.
87
Id. at 603.
88
Id. at 604.
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case, perhaps, better illustrates his commitment to maintain some level of
restraint to state legislatures in capital cases than McCleskey v. Kemp. 89
In McCleskey, the issue before the Court was whether “a complex
statistical study that indicate[d] a risk that racial considerations enter into
capital sentencing determinations prove[d] that petitioner McCleskey’s
capital sentence [was] unconstitutional under the Eighth or Fourteenth
Amendment.” 90 Justice Powell wrote the opinion for a five-to-four majority
that upheld McCleskey’s death sentence despite the overwhelming evidence
of racial bias in capital cases found in David Baldus’s study. 91
Justice Powell’s decision can be explained on the basis that there was a
lack of evidence that McCleskey personally had been the victim of racial
discrimination. 92 Equally important was the possibility that a Court remedy
would enable litigation seeking widespread remedy to such systemic
discrimination (and not necessarily just in capital cases). 93
More broadly, however, Justice Powell’s decision fits with his larger
concern for restraint and deference to the state legislatures. First, he
pointed out that
[t]here was no evidence then, and there is none now, that the Georgia Legislature
enacted the capital punishment statute to further a racially discriminatory purpose.
Nor has McCleskey demonstrated that the legislature maintains the capital punishment
statute because of the racially disproportionate impact suggested by the Baldus study.
As legislatures necessarily have wide discretion in the choice of criminal laws and
penalties, and as there were legitimate reasons for the Georgia Legislature to adopt
and maintain capital punishment, we will not infer a discriminatory purpose on the
94
part of the State of Georgia.

89

481 U.S. 279 (1987).
Id. at 282–83.
91
Id. Interestingly, the bias was based most significantly on the race of the victim. Id. at
292. Defendants who killed white victims were more likely to receive the death penalty than
those who killed African-American victims. Id. at 293. The Baldus study was a statistical
study that purported to show a disparity in the imposition of death sentences in Georgia
based on the murder victim’s race and, to a lesser extent, the defendant’s race. Id. The study
was based on over 2,000 murder cases that occurred in Georgia during the 1970s, and
involved data relating to the victim’s race, the defendant’s race, and the various
combinations of such persons’ races. Id. The study indicated that black defendants who
killed white victims had the greatest likelihood of receiving the death penalty. Id.
92
Justice Powell stressed that “the Baldus study is clearly insufficient to support an
inference that any of the decisionmakers in McCleskey’s case acted with discriminatory
purpose.” Id. at 297; see Katherine Barnes, David Sloss, & Stephen Thaman, Place Matters
(Most): An Empirical Study of Prosecutorial Decision-Making in Death Eligible Cases, 51
ARIZ. L. REV. 305 (2009); Justin D. Levinson, Race, Death, and the Complicious Mind, 58
DEPAUL L. REV. 599 (2009).
93
Justice Powell wrote, “As these examples illustrate, there is no limiting principle to the
type of challenge brought by McCleskey.” McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 318.
94
Id. at 298–99 (citations omitted).
90
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In addition, because Georgia’s legislature established a capital system that
complied with the constitutional requirements articulated in Furman,95
Justice Powell argued that the presence of racial bias in jury decisions was
not an adequate ground for declaring the capital system unconstitutional.96
Justice Powell also addressed the issue of jury discretion, citing
Woodson and highlighting the need to defer to the states on such matters in
allowing the exercise of discretion. 97 He explained that while “the power to
be lenient [also] is the power to discriminate,” 98 requiring “a capital
punishment system that did not allow for discretionary acts of leniency
‘would be totally alien to our notions of criminal justice.’” 99 Indeed, wrote
Justice Powell,
The Constitution does not require that a State eliminate any demonstrable disparity
that correlates with a potentially irrelevant factor in order to operate a criminal justice
system that includes capital punishment. As we have stated specifically in the context
of capital punishment, the Constitution does not “plac[e] totally unrealistic conditions
100
on its use.”

Beyond expressing his belief that the Court ought to defer to state
legislatures on such issues, Justice Powell went further, arguing, in fact, that
the state legislature, as opposed to the Court, ought to address such issues in
the first instance. He wrote:
McCleskey’s arguments are best presented to the legislative bodies. It is not the
responsibility—or indeed even the right—of this Court to determine the appropriate
punishment for particular crimes . . . . Legislatures also are better qualified to weigh
and “evaluate the results of statistical studies in terms of their own local conditions
101
and with a flexibility of approach that is not available to the courts.”

95

Id.
Id. at 308 (“Because McCleskey’s sentence was imposed under Georgia sentencing
procedures that focus discretion ‘on the particularized nature of the crime and the
particularized characteristics of the individual defendant,’ we lawfully may presume that
McCleskey’s death sentence was not ‘wantonly and freakishly’ imposed, and thus that the
sentence is not disproportionate within any recognized meaning under the Eighth
Amendment.”) (internal citations omitted).
97
Id. at 312. This is in stark contrast to the federal sentencing guidelines put in place
just three years prior, which sought to minimize discretion in sentencing. See, e.g., William
W. Berry III, Discretion Without Guidance: The Need to Give Meaning to § 3553 After
Booker and Its Progeny, 40 CONN. L. REV. 631 (2008) (describing the adoption of the
sentencing guidelines).
98
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 312 (quoting KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE:
A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 170 (1969)).
99
Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 200 n.50 (1976)).
100
Id. at 319 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199 n.50).
101
Id. (internal citations omitted).
96
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3. Repudiating Death
As described above, Justice Powell never crossed the second
threshold—repudiation of the death penalty—during his time on the Court.
After his retirement in 1991, however, Justice Powell continued to work on
issues related to the administration of justice in the United States. His work
on several committees seeking to improve the administration of capital
punishment may have contributed in part to his continued assessment of the
subject. 102
In the end, though, Justice Powell clearly repudiated the death penalty
in his interview with his former law clerk John Jeffries, which Jeffries made
public. 103 As described above, Justice Powell was asked whether he would
change any decision he had made while on the Supreme Court. He said that
he would change his decision in McCleskey, not just because he now
disagreed with the outcome, but more significantly, because he now thought
“that capital punishment should be abolished.”104 This change in opinion
completed the reversal from viewing capital punishment as a subject to
which the Court ought to defer entirely to state legislatures to one in which
the Constitution prohibited states from legislating at all.
In his biography of Justice Powell, Professor John Jeffries attempted to
explain Justice Powell’s “shift” in position on capital punishment:
Why then did Powell disagree? Why did he side in the end with Brennan and
Marshall rather than with his traditional allies? Why did the man who worked so hard
to preserve the constitutionality of the death penalty in Furman v. Georgia come
twenty years later to renounce it?
The answer lay partly in the bitter education of the cases. From them Powell learned
that the death penalty would never be routinely applied. Lawyers would exploit every
chance for delay, and judges would be sufficiently beset with doubts to give them
frequent opportunity. This much he learned from himself. After fifteen years of
capital cases, Powell knew firsthand their deadly hold on the judge’s peace of mind.
He knew how hard it was not to take a second, third, or fourth look at rejected claims,
how easy it seemed to put the whole thing off for one more hearing, how much
courage—or callousness—it took to treat death like any other penalty. Some judges
could achieve that emotional distance, but Powell came to believe that the system as a
whole would always be plagued by doubt and that doubting itself, it would inspire
resentment and contempt. Equally important was Powell’s declining regard for
105
judicial restraint.

Thus, according to Jeffries, Justice Powell’s repudiation of the death
penalty rested on his view that it could not be fairly applied. Rather than

102
103
104
105

JEFFRIES, supra note 5, at 451.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 452–53 (emphasis added).
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continue to give state legislatures a chance to improve the procedures and
add safeguards as the Court had done after Furman and throughout its
evolving standards of decency jurisprudence, Justice Powell’s declining
regard for the principle of judicial restraint perhaps sealed his view that the
Court ought not to continue down the same tortured path. For Justice
Powell, there was no longer a reason to continue to defer to institutions, like
state legislatures, that were unable or unwilling to remedy clear defects in
the system. 106
B. JUSTICE BLACKMUN

Just three years after Justice Powell repudiated the death penalty,
Justice Blackmun followed suit during his last term on the Supreme Court
in 1994. 107 Like Justice Powell, Justice Blackmun’s votes and opinions
provide evidence that his reversal rested more on his changing view of the
role of the Court vis-à-vis the state legislatures than on his normative view
of capital punishment. 108
1. Deferring to Death
As indicated previously, Justice Blackmun dissented in Furman
despite his strong feelings of antipathy for capital punishment. 109 He wrote:
Cases such as these provide for me an excruciating agony of the spirit. I yield to no
one in the depth of my distaste, antipathy, and, indeed, abhorrence, for the death
penalty, with all its aspects of physical distress and fear and of moral judgment
exercised by finite minds. That distaste is buttressed by a belief that capital
punishment serves no useful purpose that can be demonstrated. . . . Were I a
110
legislator, I would vote against the death penalty . . . .

Although Justice Blackmun personally agreed with the argument of the
majority in Furman regarding the policy choice to abolish capital
punishment, his firm belief in judicial restraint prevented him from joining

106
The lack of legislative response to the issues in McCleskey may also have played a
part in Justice Powell repudiating the death penalty.
107
See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143–59 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
108
Whereas Justice Powell appeared largely agnostic about capital punishment when he
arrived on the Court, Justice Blackmun had a strong dislike of capital punishment. Indeed,
Justice Blackmun’s record as a circuit judge revealed “his deep personal distaste for capital
punishment, particularly his concerns about racial disparities in its imposition and his
preference for the abolition of the death penalty through legislative and executive action
rather than via judicial intervention.” TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, HARRY A. BLACKMUN 96
(2008).
109
408 U.S. 238, 405–08 (1976) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
110
Id. at 405–06.
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that opinion. 111 In his Furman dissent, Justice Blackmun explained his
agreement with the majority’s argument:
This, for me, is good argument, and it makes some sense. But it is good argument and
it makes sense only in a legislative and executive way and not as a judicial expedient.
As I have said above, were I a legislator, I would do all I could to sponsor and to vote
for legislation abolishing the death penalty. And were I the chief executive of a
sovereign State, I would be sorely tempted to exercise executive clemency as
112
Governor Rockefeller of Arkansas did recently just before he departed from office.

At this point, however, Justice Blackmun would not allow his own
personal distaste for capital punishment to interfere with his perceived role
on the Court. 113 Instead of imposing his own normative view, Justice
Blackmun demonstrated the degree to which he valued judicial restraint.
He continued by stating:
Our task here, as must so frequently be emphasized and re-emphasized, is to pass
upon the constitutionality of legislation that has been enacted and that is challenged.
This is the sole task for judges. We should not allow our personal preferences as to
the wisdom of legislative and congressional action, or our distaste for such action, to
guide our judicial decision in cases such as these. The temptations to cross that policy
114
line are very great. In fact, as today’s decision reveals, they are almost irresistible.

Justice Blackmun perhaps best summed up the tension between his
personal views on capital punishment and his view to his role as a Justice
and the corresponding requirement of judicial restraint to state legislatures
when he said, “Although personally I may rejoice at the Court’s result, I
find it difficult to accept or to justify as a matter of history, of law, or of
constitutional pronouncement. I fear the Court has overstepped. It has
sought and has achieved an end.” 115
This view continued as the Court reinstated the death penalty in Gregg
and a series of companion cases in 1976. In all five cases decided that day,
Gregg, 116 Jurek, 117 Proffitt, 118 Woodson, 119 and Roberts, 120 Justice
Blackmun voted in favor of allowing the death penalty under each of the
state statutory schemes. He voted to uphold the mandatory death sentence

111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119

See LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN 113 (2005).
Furman, 408 U.S. at 405–06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 411 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 414.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). See supra discussion, Part II, subpart III.A.
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). See supra discussion, subpart

III.A.
120

Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
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schemes in North Carolina and Louisiana, again based on his view of
To Justice Blackmun, the establishment and
judicial restraint.121
functioning of such capital schemes was the purview of the state
legislatures and not that of the Supreme Court. Thus, Justice Blackmun
initially held firm to his Furman position that the Court should not use the
Constitution (specifically the Eighth Amendment) to restrict the ability of
the states to fashion capital schemes in a manner of their own choosing. 122
2. Regulating Death
While embracing the view that it was not appropriate for the Court to
use its power to abolish the death penalty, Justice Blackmun indicated, not
long after the Gregg cases, that it was appropriate for the Court to restrict
its use in some contexts. Thus, Justice Blackmun went along with the
Court’s constitutionalizing of the death penalty when he voted with the
majority in Coker v. Georgia. 123
Unlike in the Gregg cases, where thirty-eight state legislatures had
enacted new statutes after Furman, only three states provided for death as a
penalty for rape after Furman. 124 Accordingly, the infringement by the
Court on the power of the state legislatures here was comparatively
insignificant.
Further, the Court used its majoritarian evolving standards of decency
construct as a basis for finding that death as a punishment for rape was
cruel and unusual. 125 The Court explained that
if the “most marked indication of society’s endorsement of the death penalty for
murder is the legislative response to Furman,” it should also be a telling datum that
the public judgment with respect to rape, as reflected in the statutes providing the
punishment for that crime, has been dramatically different. In reviving death penalty

121
His opinion in all of these cases was almost identical: “I dissent for the reasons set
forth in my dissent in Furman v. Georgia, and in the other dissenting opinions I joined in
that case.” Roberts, 428 U.S. at 363 (internal citations omitted); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 307–
08 (internal citations omitted).
122
Justice Blackmun thus, unlike Justices Powell and Stevens, did not cross the threshold
of “constitutionalizing” capital punishment until after Gregg.
123
433 U.S. 584, 599 (1977) (“[T]he death sentence imposed on Coker is a
disproportionate punishment for rape.”). As discussed supra, the Court in Coker held that
the Constitution prohibited the use of the death penalty for the rape of an adult woman
because it was a disproportionate punishment. Id.
124
Id. at 594. Indeed, there had never been a majority of death penalty states that
permitted death for rape. Id.
125
Id. (“This public judgment as to the acceptability of capital punishment, evidenced by
the immediate, post-Furman legislative reaction in a large majority of the States, heavily
influenced the Court to sustain the death penalty for murder in Gregg v. Georgia.”).
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laws to satisfy Furman’s mandate, none of the States that had not previously
126
authorized death for rape chose to include rape among capital felonies.

Thus, while “[t]he current judgment with respect to the death penalty
for rape [was] not wholly unanimous among state legislatures,” 127 the
Court’s application of its evolving standards of decency analysis found that
the trend among state legislatures “obviously weighs very heavily on the
side of rejecting capital punishment as a suitable penalty for raping an adult
woman.” 128
Based upon this language, Justice Blackmun’s willingness to vote with
the majority and abandon his deferential approach to state legislatures in
agreeing that the Constitution barred the imposition of death for rape does
not seem such a significant abandonment of his earlier position.129 The
additional language from the Court in its decision, however, reveals that the
Court indeed took a significant step beyond just relying on the majoritarian
state legislative trend. The Court stressed that, in addition to examining the
trends in the various states, it was required to impose its own independent
judgment to determine whether the statute contravened the appropriate
evolving standard of decency. 130 The Court explained:
These recent events evidencing the attitude of state legislatures and sentencing juries
do not wholly determine this controversy, for the Constitution contemplates that in the
end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of
the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment. Nevertheless, the legislative
rejection of capital punishment for rape strongly confirms our own judgment, which is
that death is indeed a disproportionate penalty for the crime of raping an adult
131
woman.

By subscribing to the evolving standards of decency method of
interpretation, presumably Justice Blackmun acquiesced to the concept that,
based in part on the practices of state legislatures, Justices were to use their
own interpretive judgment to decide which state capital practices and
procedures violated the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution. 132
In Lockett v. Ohio, Justice Blackmun again showed his hesitancy to
use the Eighth Amendment to restrict the power of states to structure their
126

Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179–80 (1976)).
Id. at 595.
128
Id. at 596.
129
In many ways, this is not so different from the Gregg line of cases. See discussion
supra Part II.
130
Coker, 433 U.S. at 603 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring).
131
Id. at 597.
132
In Gardner v. Florida, Justice Blackmun again showed his willingness to follow the
Gregg line. 430 U.S. 349, 364 (1977) (holding that petitioner was denied due process of law
when death sentence was imposed on the basis of undisclosed information in the presentence
report).
127
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capital schemes as they wished. 133 In Lockett, the petitioner, the driver of a
get-away car, challenged a state law that limited the ability of a criminal
defendant to put on mitigating evidence at a capital sentencing hearing. 134
Eschewing the position of the majority (which applied Woodson), Justice
Blackmun would have found for the petitioner on alternative criminal
procedure grounds, while reaffirming his commitment to judicial
restraint. 135 He explained:
Though heretofore I have been unwilling to interfere with the legislative judgment of
the States in regard to capital sentencing procedures, . . . this Court’s judgment as to
disproportionality in Coker, in which I joined, and the unusual degree to which Ohio
requires capital punishment of a mere aider and abettor in an armed felony resulting in
a fatality even where no participant specifically intended the fatal use of a weapon, . . .
provides a significant occasion for setting some limit to the method by which the
States assess punishment for actions less immediately connected to the deliberate
136
taking of human life.

Again, Justice Blackmun was not unduly troubled by this restriction
placed on state capital processes because the “impact” was not particularly
significant in limiting the practices of large numbers of states. To that point
Justice Blackmun acknowledged that, “[o]f 34 States that now have capital
statutes, 18 specify that a minor degree of participation in a homicide may
be considered by the sentencing authority, and, of the remaining 16 States,
9 allow consideration of any mitigating factor.”137
Despite these initial concerns for restraint and deference to state
legislatures, Justice Blackmun became increasingly, but not always, willing
to vote to strike down procedures under the Eighth Amendment that he
deemed unfair. 138 In Barefoot v. Estelle, Justice Blackmun took a more
significant step towards abandoning judicial restraint.139 Justice Blackmun
dissented in Barefoot, which held that psychiatric evidence could sustain

133

438 U.S. 586, 613 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
134
Id. at 590–93.
135
Id. at 613–19 (holding the application of the Ohio death penalty statute impermissible
on alternative grounds, namely that it did not allow for consideration of Ms. Lockett’s mens
rea) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
136
Id. at 616 (internal citation omitted).
137
Id. at 616–17. Justice Blackmun likewise concurred in Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637,
643 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), a companion
case to Lockett, largely for the same reasons.
138
For instance, compare Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (holding that the
imposition of a death sentence violated the Eighth Amendment), with Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104, 120 (1979) (arguing that the Eighth Amendment did not proscribe the
imposition of a death sentence).
139
463 U.S. 880 (1983).
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the death sentence of a defendant under the Texas capital system. 140 Justice
Blackmun’s opinion took issue not only with the evidence admitted in the
case, but also with the Texas system as a whole in its reliance on future
dangerousness:
The Court holds that psychiatric testimony about a defendant’s future dangerousness
is admissible, despite the fact that such testimony is wrong two times out of three.
The Court reaches this result—even in a capital case—because, it is said, the
testimony is subject to cross-examination and impeachment. . . . In a capital case, the
specious testimony of a psychiatrist, colored in the eyes of an impressionable jury by
the inevitable untouchability of a medical specialist’s words, equates with death
itself. 141

Justice Blackmun likewise dissented in Barclay v. Florida, where the
Court upheld a death sentence despite the trial court’s error in instructing
the jury incorrectly as to one of the aggravating factors. 142 Justice
Blackmun again valued fairness of process over judicial restraint:
[W]hen a State chooses to impose capital punishment, as this Court has held a State
presently has the right to do, it must be imposed by the rule of law. . . [especially
based on] the fragility, in Barclay’s case, of the application of Florida’s established
law. The errors and missteps—intentional or otherwise—come close to making a
143
mockery of the Florida statute, and are too much for me to condone.

Justice Blackmun, however, was not yet committed to a complete
abandonment of judicial restraint, as evidenced by his majority opinion in
Spaziano v. Florida. 144 In Spaziano, the Court upheld the ability of the
judge under Florida’s capital punishment scheme to override the jury’s

140
Id. at 916. To obtain a death sentence in Texas, the State is required to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that “there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts
of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN., art. 37.071(b)(2) (West 1981).
141
Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 916 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). For a more lengthy exposition
on the problems of using future dangerousness in capital cases, see William W. Berry III,
Ending Death by Dangerousness, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 889 (2010).
142
463 U.S. 939 (1983). The trial court improperly considered the defendant’s prior
criminal record as an aggravating factor. Id. at 946. Because there were other aggravating
factors and no mitigating factors, the Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts that the
error was harmless. Id. at 958.
143
Id. at 991 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun reached a similar conclusion
in California v. Ramos, dissenting because “[t]he Court, on its own, redefines the issue in
terms of the dangerousness of the respondent, an issue that involves jury consideration of the
probability that respondent will commit acts of violence in the future. By doing so the Court
approves the Briggs Instruction by substituting an intellectual sleight of hand for legal
analysis. This kind of appellate review compounds the original unfairness of the instruction
itself, and thereby does the rule of law disservice.” 463 U.S. 992, 1029 (1983) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
144
468 U.S. 447 (1984).
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determination and impose a death sentence.145 Despite a majority of
jurisdictions choosing to use the jury, and not the judge, as the final
sentencing decisionmaker in capital cases, the Court (and Justice
Blackmun) chose to defer to the scheme adopted by the state legislature. 146
The Court explained that “‘[a]lthough the judgments of legislatures, juries,
and prosecutors weigh heavily in the balance, it is for us ultimately to judge
whether the Eighth Amendment’ is violated by a challenged practice.” 147
Here, the Court stressed that they could not conclude “that placing
responsibility on the trial judge to impose the sentence in a capital case is
unconstitutional.” 148 Emphasizing their deferential approach, the Court
finally noted that:
As the Court several times has made clear, we are unwilling to say that there is any
one right way for a State to set up its capital sentencing scheme . . . . We are not
persuaded that placing the responsibility on a trial judge to impose the sentence in a
capital case is so fundamentally at odds with contemporary standards of fairness and
decency that Florida must be required to alter its scheme and give final authority to
149
the jury to make the life-or-death decision.

Up to this point Justice Blackmun had adhered to the concept of
judicial restraint, often deferring to state legislatures while occasionally
finding certain procedural aspects of specific state capital punishment
schemes to be unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. Justice
Blackmun, however, would soon find himself on the brink of complete
abandonment of any remaining judicial restraint in moving toward the
complete repudiation of death.
3. Repudiating Death
Two cases arguably accelerated Justice Blackmun’s shift 150 from
deference toward abolition: McCleskey v. Kemp 151 (discussed above) and

145

Id.
Id. at 464 (“The fact that a majority of jurisdictions have adopted a different practice,
however, does not establish that contemporary standards of decency are offended by the jury
override. The Eighth Amendment is not violated every time a State reaches a conclusion
different from a majority of its sisters over how best to administer its criminal laws.”).
147
Id.
148
468 U.S. at 464.
149
Id. at 464–65 (internal citations omitted).
150
See Stephen L. Wasby, Justice Harry A. Blackmun: Transformation from “Minnesota
Twin” to Independent Voice, in THE BURGER COURT: POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL PROFILES 63,
70 (Charles M. Lamb & Stephen C. Halpern eds., 1991) (noting that “[a]lthough it did not
start immediately, since the ‘early Blackmun’ lasted at least several terms, Blackmun’s
change, if not completely linear, has been clear over time”).
151
481 U.S. 279 (1987).
146
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Herrera v. Collins. 152 In McCleskey, Justice Blackmun wrote separately in
dissent to express his dismay with the outcome:
The Court today sanctions the execution of a man despite his presentation of evidence
that establishes a constitutionally intolerable level of racially based discrimination
leading to the imposition of his death sentence. I am disappointed with the Court’s
action not only because of its denial of constitutional guarantees to petitioner
McCleskey individually, but also because of its departure from what seems to me to
153
be well-developed constitutional jurisprudence.

To Justice Blackmun, the Baldus study showed that “there exist[ed] in
the Georgia capital sentencing scheme a risk of racially based
discrimination that is so acute that it violates the Eighth Amendment”; the
Furman problem had reappeared, and the Georgia death sentence should be
declared unconstitutional.154 He explained that “because capital cases
involve the State’s imposition of a punishment that is unique both in kind
and degree, the decision in such cases must reflect a heightened degree of
reliability under the Amendment’s prohibition of the infliction of cruel and
unusual punishments.” 155 The clear absence of reliability, as shown by
Baldus, and the grim prospects of the states curing this defect may have
moved Blackmun one step closer to abandoning restraint entirely.
In Herrera v. Collins, the Supreme Court upheld procedural bars to
Herrera’s claim of actual innocence on habeas appeal.156 Justice Blackmun
again dissented, expressing shock at the decision to foreclose the ability to
bring a claim of innocence, even though technically procedurally barred,
stating, “Nothing could be more contrary to contemporary standards of
decency, or more shocking to the conscience, than to execute a person who
is actually innocent.” 157
He continued:
The Court’s enumeration of the constitutional rights of criminal defendants surely is
entirely beside the point. These protections sometimes fail. We really are being
asked to decide whether the Constitution forbids the execution of a person who has
been validly convicted and sentenced but who, nonetheless, can prove his innocence
with newly discovered evidence. Despite the State of Texas’ astonishing protestation
158
to the contrary, I do not see how the answer can be anything but “yes.”

152

506 U.S. 390 (1993).
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 345 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
506 U.S. 390 (1993). Herrera sought to prove his innocence by introducing an
affidavit signed by his then-deceased brother that admitted to committing the homicide for
which Herrera was found guilty. Id. at 393.
157
Id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
158
Id. at 430–31 (internal citations omitted).
153
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After a lengthy exposition of his view of the shortcomings in the majority’s
reasoning, Justice Blackmun concluded by criticizing the Court’s restraint
to the state legislatures in capital cases:
I have voiced disappointment over this Court’s obvious eagerness to do away with
any restriction on the States’ power to execute whomever and however they please. I
have also expressed doubts about whether, in the absence of such restrictions, capital
punishment remains constitutional at all. Of one thing, however, I am certain. Just as
an execution without adequate safeguards is unacceptable, so too is an execution
when the condemned prisoner can prove that he is innocent. The execution of a
159
person who can show that he is innocent comes perilously close to simple murder.

Indeed, Justice Blackmun appeared ready to repudiate the death penalty in
his Herrera dissent. 160
It was not until Callins v. Collins that Justice Blackmun truly crossed
the second threshold, repudiating the death penalty in a dissent to the denial
of certiorari. 161 After the opinion was released, Justice Brennan, “frail and
four years into retirement, telephoned and left word for Blackmun: thank
you for ‘the present.’” 162 In his dissent, Justice Blackmun gave an
extensive exposition of why he had reversed his position. 163
First, he cited what he saw as the Supreme Court’s abdication of its
duty to oversee the state legislatures in the administration of the death
penalty. In other words, Justice Blackmun believed that the Court had
accorded the states too much deference by not holding them accountable to
the requirements of Furman (restrictions that he ironically opposed in the
first place). He explained:
On their face, these goals of individual fairness, reasonable consistency, and absence
of error appear to be attainable: Courts are in the very business of erecting procedural
devices from which fair, equitable, and reliable outcomes are presumed to flow. Yet,
in the death penalty area, this Court, in my view, has engaged in a futile effort to
balance these constitutional demands, and now is retreating not only from the Furman

159

Id. at 446 (citations omitted).
See GREENHOUSE, supra note 111, at 176 (“In his Herrera dissent, Blackmun had
come close to disavowing capital punishment entirely. But still he did not cross the line, as
his longtime colleagues William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall had done.”).
161
510 U.S. 1141, 1143–59 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
Linda Greenhouse describes this turning point in her biography of Blackmun: “Now,
approaching his eighty-fifth birthday, it was time. He told his law clerks to go ahead and
draft an opinion by which he would renounce the death penalty.” See GREENHOUSE, supra
note 111, at 177. She explained, “[f]or him, capital punishment remained conceptually
acceptable, at a level of theory; he had decided that in practice, it could not be made to
operate in a constitutionally acceptable way.” Id. at 179.
162
See GREENHOUSE, supra note 111, at 179.
163
Callins, 510 U.S. at 1149 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that discretion could not
be eliminated from capital sentencing without threatening the fundamental fairness due a
defendant when life is at stake).
160
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promise of consistency and rationality, but from the requirement of individualized
sentencing as well. Having virtually conceded that both fairness and rationality
cannot be achieved in the administration of the death penalty, the Court has chosen to
deregulate the entire enterprise, replacing, it would seem, substantive constitutional
requirements with mere esthetics, and abdicating its statutorily and constitutionally
imposed duty to provide meaningful judicial oversight to the administration of death
164
by the States.

Interestingly, though, Justice Blackmun’s solution was not to reinforce
the Furman principles and demand that the states be brought back into line,
like the Court did in Furman and Gregg. Instead, he chose, as indicated in
the famous quote below, to repudiate the death penalty by having the Court
remove the ability of the states to use capital punishment. Justice
Blackmun wrote:
From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death. For more
than 20 years I have endeavored—indeed, I have struggled—along with a majority of
this Court, to develop procedural and substantive rules that would lend more than the
mere appearance of fairness to the death penalty endeavor. Rather than continue to
coddle the Court’s delusion that the desired level of fairness has been achieved and
the need for regulation eviscerated, I feel morally and intellectually obligated simply
to concede that the death penalty experiment has failed. It is virtually self-evident to
me now that no combination of procedural rules or substantive regulations ever can
save the death penalty from its inherent constitutional deficiencies. The basic
question—does the system accurately and consistently determine which defendants
“deserve” to die?—cannot be answered in the affirmative . . . . The problem is that
the inevitability of factual, legal, and moral error gives us a system that we know must
wrongly kill some defendants, a system that fails to deliver the fair, consistent, and
165
reliable sentences of death required by the Constitution.

Justice Blackmun thus concluded that the abandonment of judicial
restraint was justified by the impossibility of creating a system that was
acceptable under the Constitution. In this vein, Justice Blackmun revisited
Furman, stating that “[t]here is little doubt now that Furman’s essential
holding was correct,” 166 as “it surely is beyond dispute that if the death
penalty cannot be administered consistently and rationally, it may not be
administered at all.” 167 He explained his abandonment of restraint as
follows:
164

Id. at 1144–45 (citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 313 n.37 (1987)).
Id. at 1130 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
166
Id. at 1147. Justice Blackmun explained further, “in my mind, the real meaning of
Furman’s diverse concurring opinions did not emerge until some years after Furman was
decided” and stated that “Furman mandates that where discretion is afforded a sentencing
body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or
spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of
wholly arbitrary and capricious action.” Id. at 1147–48 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
at 189 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.)).
167
Id. (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982)).
165
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I have explained at length on numerous occasions that my willingness to enforce the
capital punishment statutes enacted by the States and the Federal Government,
“notwithstanding my own deep moral reservations . . . has always rested on an
understanding that certain procedural safeguards, chief among them the federal
judiciary’s power to reach and correct claims of constitutional error on federal habeas
review, would ensure that death sentences are fairly imposed.” In recent years, I have
grown increasingly skeptical that “the death penalty really can be imposed fairly and
in accordance with the requirements of the Eighth Amendment,” given the now
168
limited ability of the federal courts to remedy constitutional errors.

Finally, Justice Blackmun concluded his repudiation of death with a
note of hopefulness. 169 It was not a hope that the states could somehow
right their course and devise (with the Court’s help) a death penalty scheme
that satisfied the requirements of Furman and the Eighth Amendment. 170
Instead, it was a hope that a majority of Justices would reach the same
conclusion that he had and repudiate the death penalty. 171
C. JUSTICE STEVENS

1. Deferring to Death
Justice John Paul Stevens did not join the United States Supreme Court
until 1975, three years after Furman v. Georgia had been decided. Like
Justices Powell and Blackmun, Justice Stevens valued judicial restraint to
other political institutions in his early years as a judge.172 Just a year before
his appointment to the Supreme Court, Justice Stevens, then a circuit judge,
explained his views on restraint in a speech at Northwestern University
School of Law:
The prevalence of widespread potential for error among other decisionmakers is one
of the factors that repeatedly prompts invitations to federal judges to substitute their
views for the erroneous conclusions of others . . . . [T]he temptation to accept and
invitation of this kind is always alluring, but whenever the federal judiciary does
accept, three things inevitably happen. First, our workload increases and our ability to
process it effectively diminishes . . . . Second, the potential for diverse decisions by
other decisionmakers is diminished and another step in the direction of nationwide
uniformity is taken . . . . And third, we substitute our mistakes for the mistakes
theretofore made by others. Sometimes that price is well worth paying; it is, however,
173
a cost of which we should always be conscious.

168

Id. at 1157 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1159.
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
ROBERT JUDD SICKELS, JOHN PAUL STEVENS AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE SEARCH FOR
BALANCE 30 (1988) (explaining how Justice Stevens retained, at least for a while, a strong
belief in restraint).
173
Id.
169
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During his confirmation hearing, then-Judge Stevens was asked about
his view of judicial restraint:
Senator Scott of Virginia: So I ask you, and I think it is entirely proper to ask, when
you become a member of the Supreme Court—and I have no real doubt that you
will—is it your intention to exercise judicial restraint?
Judge Stevens: Yes, it is, Senator. I think it is the business of a judge to decide cases
that come before him. From time to time, in the process of deciding cases, important
decisions are made and the law takes a little different turn from time to time. But it
has always been my philosophy to decide cases on the narrowest ground possible and
not to reach out for constitutional questions. I think that is the tradition of the work of
the Supreme Court and I think the Court is most effective when it does its own
174
business the best.

Thus, Justice Stevens shared the initial perspective of Justices Powell
and Blackmun that the role of the Supreme Court Justice was not to
substitute his or her personal political views for the prior law, whether
common law or statutory.
As discussed above in subpart III.A, Justice Stevens, as one of the
three Justices in the controlling plurality (termed the “Powell plurality”
above), agreed to cross the initial threshold of constitutionalizing capital
punishment by applying the Eighth Amendment to it, but did so in large
part because the chosen standard, the evolving standards of decency, still
accorded significant restraint to state legislatures.175
Similarly, Justice Stevens agreed with the majority (and Justice
Blackmun) in Coker, where as discussed above the Court took two
important steps in establishing the evolving standards of decency
approach. 176 First, the Court emphasized that state legislatures (and juries)
determined, in large part, what the appropriate standard was. 177 Second, the
Court explained that its own judgment as to the appropriate standard of
decency, and not its examination of the states’ practices, ultimately
determined what practices were constitutional under the Eighth
Amendment. 178 Thus, while seemingly resting its decision on the notion of
174
Nomination of John Paul Stevens to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 35–36, reprinted
in 8A THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL
AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE SENATE JUDICIARY
COMMITTEE, 1916–1975, at 35–36 (Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein eds., 1977)
(testimony of John Paul Stevens, Dec. 8, 1975).
175
See id.; see also Berry, supra note 70.
176
See discussion supra subpart III.B.
177
See discussion supra subpart III.B; Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
178
Coker, 433 U.S. at 584 (“[T]he Constitution contemplates that in the end our own
judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty
under the Eighth Amendment.”)
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restraint to the states, the majority (including Justice Stevens) was careful to
carve out analytical room to choose not to defer in the future.179 The Court
reiterated both of these views years later in Atkins v. Virginia and again in
Roper v. Simmons. 180
2. Regulating Death
Two competing principles framed Justice Stevens’s approach in the
post-Gregg cases. On the one hand, because there can be no perfect way to
administer a death penalty system, the Court ought to defer generally to
state legislatures unless their administration of capital punishment is
fundamentally unfair. 181 On the other hand, Justice Stevens recognized the
heightened need for the Court to intervene to ensure the reliability and
fairness of the imposition of death sentences. 182 This second principle was
based in large part on the Justices’ notion that “death is different,” and
accordingly gave the Court a stronger interest in regulating its use by the
Thus, concluded Justice Stevens, “although not every
states. 183
imperfection in the deliberative process is sufficient, even in a capital case,
to set aside a state-court judgment, the severity of the sentence mandates
careful scrutiny in the review of any colorable claim of error.”184

179

Id.
See discussion infra Part III.
181
See, e.g., Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638 n. 13 (1980); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586, 605 (1978) (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 192–95 (1976).
182
See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 616–17 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(noting that, as “death is not reversible,” DNA evidence that the convictions of numerous
persons on death row were erroneous is especially alarming); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S.
447, 460 n.7 (1984) (“[T]he death sentence is unique in its severity and in its
irrevocability . . . .”); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (“There is no question that
death as a punishment is unique in its severity and irrevocability.”); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (stating that death differs from life imprisonment
because of its “finality”); see also Jeffrey Abramson, Death-Is-Different Jurisprudence and
the Role of the Capital Jury, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 117 (2004).
183
See, e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 884–85 (1983) (“Two themes have been
reiterated in our opinions discussing the procedures required by the Constitution in capital
sentencing determinations. On the one hand . . . there can be no perfect procedure for
deciding in which cases governmental authority should be used to impose death. On the
other hand, because there is a qualitative difference between death and any other permissible
form of punishment, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the
determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.”) (internal citations
omitted). This is true, of course, because “[i]t is of vital importance to the defendant and to
the community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on
reason rather than caprice or emotion.” Id. at 885 (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349,
358 (1977)).
184
Id. at 885.
180
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Although Justice Stevens voted in the Gregg majority, he only voted
that way because he believed that states would provide significant
procedural safeguards to capital punishment defendants. 185 Justice Stevens
was a firm believer in fundamental fairness and making sure the states
comported with due process. 186 In Barclay v. Florida, Justice Stevens
explained, “[f]urther, a constant theme of our cases—from Gregg and
Proffitt through Godfrey, Eddings, and most recently Zant—has been
emphasis on procedural protections that are intended to ensure that the
death penalty will be imposed in a consistent, rational manner[,]”187 again
reasoning that procedural and fundamental fairness were essential to death
penalty jurisprudence. What is more important, however, is the first sign of
Justice Stevens’s personal view of the death penalty: “The cursory analysis
in the two opinions upholding petitioner’s death sentence—which
admittedly I do not applaud—does not require us to set aside the sentence
when we have determined that the sentence itself does not suffer from any
constitutional flaw.” 188
Indeed, in Pulley v. Harris, Justice Stevens voted to uphold the state’s
procedure, despite a clear opportunity to do otherwise.189 He concurred
with Justice White’s majority opinion, which held that the Constitution did
not require states to implement proportionality review. 190 The Court's belief
here was that the states could implement capital punishment via a number
of different legislative mechanisms so long as they provided some level of
safeguard as required by Furman. 191 Justice Stevens therefore was willing
to defer to the method adopted by the state legislatures so long as it
achieved the proper ends: protection against arbitrariness. He thus voted to
defer to the state’s scheme despite his belief that “the case law does
establish that appellate review plays an essential role in eliminating the
systemic arbitrariness and capriciousness which infected death penalty
schemes invalidated by Furman v. Georgia, and hence that some form of
meaningful appellate review is constitutionally required.” 192 Justice
Stevens’s view that appellate review was an essential element stemmed
back to Furman v. Georgia and its basic concept of eliminating the
arbitrariness and capriciousness for death penalty imposition.193
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193

Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977).
Id. at 358.
Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 960 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 974 (emphasis added).
465 U.S. 37 (1984).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 54 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
Id. at 55.
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Even as Justice Stevens was advocating judicial restraint, he began to
develop the fundamental fairness principle in other cases, as evidenced by
his opinion in Spaziano v. Florida.194 Justice Stevens’s Spaziano opinion
disagreed with the majority view that the judge could overrule the jury
sentence in a death case.195 He based his lack of restraint toward the
Florida scheme on the second of the above principles—that the uniqueness
of death supported heightened scrutiny. 196 He explained:
The concept of due process permits no such deprivation—whether of life, liberty, or
property—to occur if it is grossly excessive in the particular case—if it is “cruel and
unusual punishment” proscribed by the Eighth Amendment . . . [f]or although we look
to state law as the source of the right to property, “it is not the source of liberty, and
surely not the exclusive source.” Because a deprivation of liberty is qualitatively
different from a deprivation of property, heightened procedural safeguards are a
hallmark of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence. But that jurisprudence has also
unequivocally established that a State’s deprivation of a person’s life is also
197
qualitatively different from any lesser intrusion on liberty.

Justice Stevens then explained why allowing a judge to overrule a jury
contravenes the role of the community as the ultimate decisionmaker of life
or death:
Because it is the one punishment that cannot be prescribed by a rule of law as judges
normally understand such rules, but rather is ultimately understood only as an
expression of the community’s outrage—its sense that an individual has lost his moral
entitlement to live—I am convinced that the danger of an excessive response can only
be avoided if the decision to impose the death penalty is made by a jury, rather than
198
by a single governmental official.

He added:
If the State wishes to execute a citizen, it must persuade a jury of his peers that death
is an appropriate punishment for his offense. If it cannot do so, then I do not believe it

194

468 U.S. 447 (1984).
Id. at 467 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
196
As Justice Stevens pointed out, every member of the Court had, at that point,
subscribed to the “death is different” doctrine: “In the 12 years since Furman v. Georgia,
every Member of this Court has written or joined at least one opinion endorsing the
proposition that because of its severity and irrevocability, the death penalty is qualitatively
different from any other punishment, and hence must be accompanied by unique safeguards
to ensure that it is a justified response to a given offense.” Id. at 468 (citation omitted); see
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 227, 289 (1983); id. at 306 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U. S. 782, 797 (1982); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U. S. 625, 637–638 (1980);
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263, 272 (1980); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586, 604–605
(1978) (plurality opinion); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584, 598 (1977) (plurality opinion);
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U. S. 349, 357–58 (1977) (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U. S. 153, 188 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
197
Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 468 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
198
Id. at 469–70.
195
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can be said with an acceptable degree of assurance that imposition of the death
199
penalty would be consistent with the community’s sense of proportionality.

For Justice Stevens, then, the Court ought to intervene where the
decision to sentence a defendant to death did not reflect the community
sentiment. In other words, like Justice Blackmun, Justice Stevens was
willing to use the death-is-different principle as a means to regulate state
legislatures when doing so did not undermine the popular political will (as
reflected in jury decisions).
Justice Stevens reiterated this principle in McCleskey. 200 Citing
Gardner, 201 Zant, 202 and Spaziano, 203 he emphasized the importance of
scrutinizing death decisions and the requirement that such decisions be
based on reason and not emotion, particularly where the jury decision may
have been influenced by race.204 For Justice Stevens, “[t]his sort of
disparity is constitutionally intolerable.”205
While Justice Stevens then pointed out that the majority’s opinion
“flagrantly violate[d] the Court’s prior ‘insistence that capital punishment
be imposed fairly, and with reasonable consistency, or not at all,’” 206 he did
not think that the Baldus study’s results necessarily foreclosed the use of
the death penalty. As he explained,
One of the lessons of the Baldus study is that there exist certain categories of
extremely serious crimes for which prosecutors consistently seek, and juries
consistently impose, the death penalty without regard to the race of the victim or the
race of the offender. If Georgia were to narrow the class of death-eligible defendants
to those categories, the danger of arbitrary and discriminatory imposition of the death
207
penalty would be significantly decreased, if not eradicated.

Therefore, while McCleskey moved Justice Blackmun towards repudiation,
Justice Stevens again saw a possibility for forcing the states to continue to
improve upon the capital sentencing process to cure its defects.
Nonetheless, Justice Stevens continued over time to intervene deeper
and deeper into the state capital processes, voting repeatedly to restrict the
death penalty in various ways. Again, fundamental fairness played the

199

Id. at 490.
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); see discussion supra, subparts III.A and
III.B.(describing the majority opinion by Justice Powell and Justice Blackmun’s dissenting
opinion).
201
430 U.S. at 358.
202
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1982).
203
Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 469 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
204
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 366 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
205
Id.
206
Id. at 366–67 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982)).
207
Id. at 367.
200
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central role in Justice Stevens’s views. 208 The most significant of these
decisions are the victim impact evidence cases and the “defendant
characteristics” cases. In Booth v. Maryland, 209 South Carolina v.
Gathers, 210 and Payne v. Tennessee, 211 Justice Stevens voted against
allowing victim impact testimony and evidence into evidence at death
penalty trials, holding that admission of such evidence during the penalty
phase of a capital trial was unconstitutional. In his dissent in Payne, Justice
Stevens explained why he believed that such evidence violates the
Constitution:
The fact that each of us is unique is a proposition so obvious that it surely requires no
evidentiary support. What is not obvious, however, is the way in which the character
or reputation in one case may differ from that of other possible victims. Evidence
offered to prove such differences can only be intended to identify some victims as
more worthy of protection than others. Such proof risks decisions based on the same
invidious motives as a prosecutor’s decision to seek the death penalty if a victim is
212
white, but to accept a plea bargain if the victim is black.

Perhaps more importantly, Justice Stevens revealed a growing distrust
with state institutions based on the rise of penal populism: 213
Given the current popularity of capital punishment in a crime-ridden society, the
political appeal of arguments that assume that increasing the severity of sentences is
the best cure for the cancer of crime, and the political strength of the “victims’ rights”
movement, I recognize that today’s decision will be greeted with enthusiasm by a
large number of concerned and thoughtful citizens. The great tragedy of the decision,
however, is the danger that the “hydraulic pressure” of public opinion that Justice
Holmes once described—and that properly influences the deliberations of democratic
legislatures—has played a role not only in the Court’s decision to hear this case, and
in its decision to reach the constitutional question without pausing to consider
affirming on the basis of the Tennessee Supreme Court’s rationale, but even in its
resolution of the constitutional issue involved. Today is a sad day for a great
214
institution.

208

See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 23 (1989) (quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 446
U.S. 420, 428 (1980)) (“It is therefore an integral component of a State’s constitutional
responsibility to tailor and apply its law in a manner that avoids the arbitrary and capricious
infliction of the death penalty.”).
209
482 U.S. 496, 509 (1987).
210
490 U.S. 805, 812 (1990).
211
501 U.S. 808, 866 (1991).
212
Id. at 866 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
213
See generally DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL (2001); JOHN PRATT,
PENAL POPULISM (2006). See also William W. Berry III, Extraordinary and Compelling: A
Re-examination of the Justifications for Compassionate Release, 68 MD. L. REV. 850 (2009)
(discussing the rampant level of imprisonment in the United States).
214
Payne, 501 U.S. at 867 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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From 1991 to 2002, Justice Stevens continued to move toward
repudiating capital punishment. 215 He consistently voted to restrict the use
of the death penalty where he believed that the states’ use was
“fundamentally unfair” or infringed upon “human dignity.” 216
Justice Stevens’s increasing disdain for states and their inability to use
the death penalty in a fair way paralleled the Court’s broadening of the
evolving standards of decency doctrine that began in 2002. In Atkins v.
Virginia, 217 Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion banning the
execution of individuals who are mentally retarded, reversing the Court’s
decision in Penry v. Lynaugh just thirteen years earlier.218 Applying the
evolving standards of decency standard, the Court found that, even though a
majority of states had not banned capital punishment for mentally retarded
individuals (eighteen states), 219 the trend among the states was moving in
the direction of banning execution of such individuals.220 In light of several
states recently banning the execution of mentally retarded individuals,
Justice Stevens reasoned that “[i]t is not so much the number of these States
that is significant, but the consistency of the direction of change.”221
Perhaps equally important was the fact that “even among those States that

215

See infra note 217.
See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 361 (1992) (“[F]undamental fairness is more
than accuracy at trial.”); Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 377 (1993) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Fretwell v. Lockhart, 754 F. 2d 258 (8th Cir. 1991)) (“‘[F]undamental
unfairness exists when a prisoner receives a death sentence rather than life imprisonment
solely because of his attorney’s error.’”); Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 981 (1994)
(“I believe, that the failure to characterize factors such as the age of the defendant or the
circumstances of the crime as either aggravating or mitigating is also unobjectionable.”);
Jacobs v. Scott, 513 U.S. 1067, 1067 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(“In my opinion, it is fundamentally unfair for the State of Texas to go forward with the
execution of Jesse Dewayne Jacobs.”); Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272,
293–94 (1998) (“For ‘death is a different kind of punishment from any other which may be
imposed in this country.’”); Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 189 (2002) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“A rule that allows the State to foist a murder victim’s lawyer onto his accused
is not only capricious; it poisons the integrity of our adversary system of justice.”).
217
536 U.S. 304 (2002).
218
492 U.S. 302 (1989).
219
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314–16 (2002).
220
Id. at 315–17.
221
Id. at 315. Interestingly, Justice Stevens found this trend more compelling because it
moved against the direction of the penal populism he had emphasized in Payne. Id. at 315–
16 (“Given the well-known fact that anticrime legislation is far more popular than legislation
providing protections for persons guilty of violent crime, the large number of States
prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded persons (and the complete absence of States
passing legislation reinstating the power to conduct such executions) provides powerful
evidence that today our society views mentally retarded offenders as categorically less
culpable than the average criminal.”).
216

480

WILLIAM W. BERRY III

[Vol. 101

regularly execute offenders and that have no prohibition with regard to the
mentally retarded, only five have executed offenders possessing a known
IQ less than 70 since we decided Penry.” 222
As in earlier cases, the Court likewise “brought to bear” 223 its own
judgment, finding that the evolving standard of decency warranted this
prohibition. 224 Justice Stevens explained that “[t]his is the judgment of
most of the legislatures that have recently addressed the matter, and we
have no reason to disagree with that judgment for purposes of construing
and applying the Eighth Amendment.” 225
Separate from its interpretation of the consensus among state
legislatures, the Court analyzed the degree to which permitting such
executions “will measurably advance the deterrent or the retributive
purpose of the death penalty.” 226 In its independent evaluation, the Court
explained its belief that:
[t]his consensus unquestionably reflects widespread judgment about the relative
culpability of mentally retarded offenders, and the relationship between mental
retardation and the penological purposes served by the death penalty. Additionally, it
suggests that some characteristics of mental retardation undermine the strength of the
227
procedural protections that our capital jurisprudence steadfastly guards.

As a result, the Court concluded that “such punishment is excessive and that
the Constitution ‘places a substantive restriction on the State’s power to
take the life’ of a mentally retarded offender.” 228
While the Court at the very least feigned some level of restraint to the
state legislatures, Justice Stevens (and the Court) made it explicit, in a
manner more demonstrated than before, that they could and should be
making such policy judgments as the one decided here—whether it was
acceptable to execute mentally retarded individuals. Justice Stevens (voting
with the majority) became even more brazen in exercising this independent
judgment and moving away from any need to defer to the states in the next
significant evolving standards of decency case, Roper v. Simmons. 229

222
Id. at 316. As in Furman, the lack of use made “[t]he practice [of executing mentally
retarded individuals], therefore, has become truly unusual, and it is fair to say that a national
consensus has developed against it.” Id.
223
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977). As mentioned earlier, the Court’s
inquiry is “asking whether there is reason to disagree with the judgment reached by the
citizenry and its legislators.” Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313.
224
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
225
Id. at 313 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)).
226
Id. at 321.
227
Id. at 317.
228
Id. at 321 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986)).
229
543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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The issue in Roper was whether the Eighth Amendment permitted
states to execute individuals for crimes they committed before reaching the
age of eighteen. 230 As with Atkins, this case revisited an earlier opinion of
the Court on the same issue. In Stanford v. Kentucky, the Court had
rejected any constitutional limitation on the execution of such individuals
so long as they were fifteen or older 231 at the time of the crime. 232
As in Atkins, the Court started with a “review of objective indicia of
consensus, as expressed in particular by the enactments of legislatures that
have addressed the question.” 233 Like in Atkins, a majority of states
allowed the state practice at issue.234 Even worse than Atkins, however,
there was less evidence of a trend toward the abolition of executing
individuals who committed capital crimes before age eighteen.235
After somehow finding consensus among state legislatures, the Court
in Roper unflinchingly exercised its own independent judgment, explaining
why it was improper to allow states to execute juvenile offenders:
The differences between juvenile and adult offenders are too marked and well
understood to risk allowing a youthful person to receive the death penalty despite
insufficient culpability. An unacceptable likelihood exists that the brutality or coldblooded nature of any particular crime would overpower mitigating arguments based
on youth as a matter of course, even where the juvenile offender’s objective
immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should require a sentence less
236
severe than death.

Interestingly, the Court then looked to international opinion to justify
its exercise of independent judgment. 237 This step beyond the state
legislatures belies the shift in restraint. In Atkins and Roper, Justice Stevens
(and the majority) seem to be looking at the practices of the state
230

Id. at 555–56.
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). The Court had set age sixteen (at the
time of the crime) as a minimum for death penalty eligibility in an earlier case, Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), in which Justice Stevens authored the majority opinion.
Following the evolving standards of decency, the Court in Thompson explained that no death
penalty state that had given express consideration to a minimum age for the death penalty
had set the age lower than sixteen. Id. at 826–29. In bringing its own independent judgment
to bear, the Thompson Court also emphasized that “[t]he reasons why juveniles are not
trusted with the privileges and responsibilities of an adult also explain why their
irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.” Id. at 835.
232
Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380.
233
Roper, 543 U.S. at 564.
234
Id. at 563–66.
235
Id. at 565–66.
236
Id. at 572–73.
237
Id. at 575–78. The use of international practices as a barometer for evolving
standards of decency has not been without controversy. See, e.g., David Fontana, Refined
Comparatism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 539 (2001).
231
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legislatures less out of an obligation to exercise some level of restraint, and
more out of a perceived need to legitimize the exercise of their own
independent judgment in capital cases.238 The categorical exclusion of
certain groups of individuals seems to be less a decision of regulating state
procedures and more of a step toward abolition altogether.
In his Roper concurrence, Justice Stevens hinted that the Court ought
to be willing to reexamine its prior capital punishment precedents:
Perhaps even more important than our specific holding today is our reaffirmation of
the basic principle that informs the Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment.
If the meaning of that Amendment had been frozen when it was originally drafted, it
would impose no impediment to the execution of 7-year-old children today. The
evolving standards of decency that have driven our construction of this critically
important part of the Bill of Rights foreclose any such reading of the Amendment. In
the best tradition of the common law, the pace of that evolution is a matter for
continuing debate; but that our understanding of the Constitution does change from
time to time has been settled since John Marshall breathed life into its text. If great
lawyers of his day—Alexander Hamilton, for example—were sitting with us today, I
would expect them to join Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court. In all events, I do
239
so without hesitation.

Further, he foreshadowed his opinion as to whether the Court ought to
abandon restraint to state legislatures altogether and abolish the death
penalty under the evolving standards of decency doctrine.
3. Repudiating Death
After over three decades of allowing states to regulate capital
punishment Justice Stevens finally decided that the states could never
remedy the problem. In Baze v. Rees, the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of Kentucky’s method of execution: its three-drug lethal
injection protocol.240 While the Court upheld Kentucky’s procedure,
Justice Stevens wrote separately and concluded that capital punishment was
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. 241
Ironically writing a concurrence, Justice Stevens clearly demonstrated
his abandonment of restraint in favor of state legislatures. 242 He describes
their retention of the death penalty as follows:
238

See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321–24 (2002); Roper, 543 U.S. at 563–66.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 587 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
240
553 U.S. 35 (2008). The result of the Court’s decision to grant certiorari was a hiatus
of almost a year in executions in the United States. See, e.g., DEATH PENALTY INFO CTR.,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions-united-states (last visited Feb. 14, 2011).
241
Baze, 553 U.S. at 86 (Stevens, J., concurring).
242
Id. at 87. He explained that his decision that the death penalty is unconstitutional
“does not justify a refusal to respect precedents that remain a part of our law,” but this
explanation seems, on some level, unconvincing. Id.
239
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The thoughtful opinions written by the Chief Justice and by Justice Ginsburg have
persuaded me that current decisions by state legislatures, by the Congress of the
United States, and by this Court to retain the death penalty as a part of our law are the
product of habit and inattention rather than an acceptable deliberative process that
weighs the costs and risks of administering that penalty against its identifiable
benefits, and rest in part on a faulty assumption about the retributive force of the death
243
penalty.

Applying his own independent evolving standards of decency-type
analysis, Justice Stevens questioned the utility of the death penalty based on
its inability to achieve the purposes of punishment, particularly
retribution. 244 As a result, Justice Stevens argued that “[f]ull recognition of
the diminishing force of the principal rationales for retaining the death
penalty should lead this Court and legislatures to reexamine the
question . . . ‘[i]s it time to Kill the Death Penalty?’” 245
Justice Stevens then explained that the Court’s holdings in Gregg and
its companion cases afforded a level of judicial restraint toward the states’
use of capital punishment because the Court “relied heavily on our belief
that adequate procedures were in place that would avoid the danger of
discriminatory application . . . arbitrary application . . . and of
excessiveness.” 246 As described above, Justice Stevens (and the Court)
tempered this restraint with its application of “the premise that ‘death is
different’ from every other form of punishment to justify rules minimizing
the risk of error in capital cases.” 247 This process, however, had been
largely unsuccessful according to Justice Stevens. Despite these purported
safeguards, Justice Stevens noted, there were still obvious problems with
the administration of the death penalty. 248
First, Justice Stevens questioned the process by which juries were
constructed in capital cases, through “death qualifi[cation],” a process that
raised questions as to whether the jury was truly representative of the
community. 249 Second, Justice Stevens pointed out that “the risk of error in
capital cases may be greater than in other cases because the facts are often
so disturbing that the interest in making sure the crime does not go
unpunished may overcome residual doubt concerning the identity of the
243

Id. at 78.
Id. at 80–81.
245
Id. at 81 (internal citations omitted).
246
Id. at 84 (internal citations omitted).
247
Id. at 84; see supra note 197 (describing the Court’s “death is different”
jurisprudence).
248
Baze, 553 U.S. at 84. Justice Stevens also pointed out that “[i]ronically, however,
more recent cases have endorsed procedures that provide less protections to capital
defendants than to ordinary offenders.” Id.
249
Id.
244
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offender.” 250 Like Justice Blackmun, Justice Stevens also expressed
concern about the continued “risk of discriminatory application of the death
penalty.” Citing the Court’s decision in McCleskey, Justice Stevens argued
that “the Court has allowed [this risk] to continue to play an unacceptable
role in capital cases.” 251
Ultimately, however, it was the combination of the risk of error
described above and the consequences of such error that led Justice Stevens
to cross the second threshold and conclude that capital punishment should
be abolished, rather than allow the states another opportunity to correct
these problems. 252 He emphasized that “[w]hether or not any innocent
defendants have actually been executed, abundant evidence accumulated in
recent years has resulted in the exoneration of an unacceptable number of
defendants found guilty of capital offenses.” 253 Rather than continue to
defer to the states to remedy these problems, Justice Stevens concluded that
the better answer was to eliminate the death penalty entirely, as “[t]he risk
of executing innocent defendants can be entirely eliminated by treating any
penalty more severe than life imprisonment without the possibility of parole
as constitutionally excessive.” 254 He summed up by quoting Justice
White’s Furman opinion, suggesting that despite the efforts of the Court
and the state legislatures, little had changed:
[J]ust as Justice White ultimately based his conclusion in Furman on his extensive
exposure to countless cases for which death is the authorized penalty, I have relied on
my own experience in reaching the conclusion that the imposition of the death penalty
represents “the pointless and needless extinction of life with only marginal
contributions to any discernible social or public purposes. A penalty with such

250

Id. at 84–85. Not helping matters was the Court’s recent jurisprudence in which its
“former emphasis on the importance of ensuring that decisions in death cases be adequately
supported by reason rather than emotion has been undercut by more recent decisions placing
a thumb on the prosecutor’s side of the scales.” Id. at 85. Justice Stevens cited Kansas v.
Marsh, 548 U.S. 163 (2006), where the Court upheld a state statute that requires imposition
of the death penalty when the jury finds that the aggravating and mitigating factors are in
equipoise, and Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808 (1991), described supra in section III.C.2,
as examples of the Court’s undercutting of this principle.
251
Baze, 553 U.S. at 85. Justice Stevens also cited Evans v. State, 914 A.2d 25, 64 (Md.
2006), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 835 (2007), where the Court affirmed “a death sentence despite
the existence of a study showing that ‘the death penalty is statistically more likely to be
pursued against a black person who murders a white victim than against a defendant in any
other racial combination.’”
252
Baze, 553 U.S. at 86.
253
Id. (citing Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM L. REV. 55 (2008) and
D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empircally Justified Factual Wrongful
Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761 (2007)); see infra note 269 (discussing
the Cameron Todd Willingham case).
254
Baze, 553 U.S. at 86 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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negligible returns to the State [is] patently excessive and cruel and unusual
255
punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment.”

A few months after Baze, Justice Stevens joined in the majority
opinion in Kennedy v. Louisiana, a case that prohibited the use of the death
penalty for child rapists.256 Like Atkins and Roper, the Court in Kennedy
applied its evolving standards of decency analysis to the use of child rape
by state legislatures.257 Kennedy, like Coker, did not require the Court to
use its own subjective judgment or trammel on the practices of a number of
state legislatures, as almost all states banned execution for child rapists. 258
Nonetheless, the majority was not sympathetic, and demonstrated no desire
to offer deference to the Louisiana state legislature. 259
After his retirement from the Court last summer, Justice Stevens has
become an increasingly vocal opponent of capital punishment, and recently
explained in a 60 Minutes interview:
I think we would all be better off if we simply changed course and did away with the
death penalty . . . . I think that would be the best rule to follow because that’s
260
basically the rule that is followed in most civilized countries as you know . . . .

Justice Stevens also reviewed David Garland's book, Peculiar Institution:
America's Death Penalty in an Age of Abolition, further supporting the
conclusion that Justice Stevens believes that there is no way to administer
the death penalty fairly. 261 Justice Stevens explained:
When I wrote those words [that death is different] I was thinking about individual
decisions in specific cases. Professor Garland’s book persuades me that my comment
is equally applicable to legislative decisions authorizing imposition of death
sentences. To be reasonable, legislative imposition of death eligibility must be rooted
in benefits for at least one of the five classes of persons affected by capital
262
offenses.
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Even after Baze, Justice Stevens has continued to question the procedures by which the death
penalty is administered in the United States. In Walker v. Georgia, Justice Stevens dissented
to the denial of certiorari in a case where the petitioner challenged the administration of
proportionality review by the Georgia Supreme Court. 129 S. Ct. 253 (2008). The petitioner
challenged the same process that the Court approved in Gregg.
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60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast Nov. 28, 2010), available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=7096956n&tag=contentBody;housing.
261
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http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/dec/23/death-sentence/.
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Justice Stevens concluded by stating that none of the benefits outweighed
the costs of keeping the death penalty. 263
IV. PANDORA’S BOX AND THE INEVITABILITY OF REPUDIATION
After arriving among mortals, Pandora opened the lid of a great jar that she had with
her, causing a host of evils and disease to be released among the mortals for the first
time; for until that moment, men had lived on the earth free from toil and sickness and
264
other ills.

Having established that the three parallel shifts in perspective as to the
use of capital punishment are questions of institutional and not normative
choice, this Article concludes by claiming that these outcomes are
inevitable consequences of the initial decision to constitutionalize capital
punishment.
In reviewing the capital jurisprudence of the United States Supreme
Court since Furman through the lens of institutional choice, the result of
abandoning judicial restraint appears to be one of opening a sort of
constitutional Pandora’s box. 265 In other words, by constitutionalizing
capital punishment through its application of the Eighth Amendment, the
Court exposed itself to a complex, multilayered morass of problems that it
is ill-equipped to remedy.
These problems began with Furman, where a fractured majority (each
Justice wrote their own opinion) held capital punishment as instituted by the
states was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. 266 In Furman, the Court highlighted many problems with the
death penalty, most notably the manner in which the death penalty was
arbitrarily and disproportionately applied to certain minority groups. 267
And in recent years, the problems have only magnified, with studies
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ROBIN HARD, THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF GREEK MYTHOLOGY 95 (2004).
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In Hesiod’s epic poem World and Days, he describes the story of Pandora. After
Prometheus stole fire and returned it to mortals, Zeus ordered Hephaestus to create the first
woman. The gods named this woman “Allgifts” (Pandora) because she was the gift of all the
gods, “a calamity for men,” a “precipitous, unmanageable trap.” Prometheus had warned his
brother Epimetheus not to accept gifts from Zeus, but he did not heed this advice and
accepted Pandora as his bride. In anticipation of the marriage, Pandora was given an
amphora, or storage jar, as her trousseau. When she opened the amphora out flew “grievous
sicknesses that are deadly to men,” “grim cares,” and “countless troubles,” only hope
remained in the box. See HESIOD, THEOGONY AND WORKS AND DAYS 38–40 (M.L. West
trans., 1988).
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Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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Id. at 256–57 (Douglas, J., concurring); see also id. at 242; id. at 308–10 (Stewart, J.,
concurring); id. at 310–11, 313–14 (White, J., concurring).
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demonstrating vast amounts of error 268 and increasing discoveries of
innocent individuals on death row as well as the likelihood that innocent
individuals have, in fact, been executed.269
The “discovery” of such a complex and intractable set of problems is
certainly not unique to the Eighth Amendment. For instance, the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition against search and seizure has become a
complicated mess with no clear rule to determine what constitutes a
reasonable search or seizure. 270 The same is true for the voting
apportionment cases—once the Court applied the Constitution, the Court
opened the door to a number of interpretive problems. 271 The First
Amendment Establishment Clause jurisprudence followed the same
pattern. 272 The application of the Constitution in a single case to an area
formerly controlled by state government legislation opens the door to a
series of interpretive problems that are difficult to solve on a case-by-case
basis. Thus, despite the Court’s best efforts to limit its involvement in such
areas, based on an abundance of caution and restraint in applying such
open-ended constitutional language, the outcome is a long series of cases
through which it becomes increasingly difficult to establish intelligible
principles and bright-line rules.
In all of these examples, experience cautions against the Court’s
intervention into matters that have been historically addressed by the state
legislatures. This concept of judicial restraint and deference toward state
legislatures makes sense at first blush as a matter of institutional choice.
State legislatures have a political process that can create nuanced and
complex sets of rules, conduct thorough research and inquiry, and modify
such rules as experience demonstrates their flaws and shortcomings.
Further, state legislatures, as institutions comprised of elected officials, are
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271
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
272
See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).

488

WILLIAM W. BERRY III

[Vol. 101

subject to majoritarian opinions and values. Finally, state legislatures enjoy
the ability to compare themselves with each other as competing
experimental laboratories. Indeed, one of the important values of our
federalist system of government, as Justice Brandeis famously stated, is that
“a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory;
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of
the country.” 273
On the other hand, the Court does have a responsibility to protect the
individual rights of citizens against the potential tyrannical overreaching of
those same state legislatures. The Constitution, and in particular, the Bill of
Rights, relies on the Court to intervene to protect those rights. As Justice
White has explained,
Judicial review, by definition, often involves a conflict between judicial and
legislative judgment as to what the Constitution means or requires. In this respect,
Eighth Amendment cases come to us in no different posture. It seems conceded by all
that the Amendment imposes some obligations on the judiciary to judge the
constitutionality of punishment and that there are punishments that the Amendment
274
would bar whether legislatively approved or not.

Given the opaque language of the provision applicable here—“cruel
and unusual” punishment—attempting to protect citizens’ rights under a
modern understanding 275 of such words 276 invites the opening of a judicial
Pandora’s box. 277
Thus, this Pandora’s box understanding of judicial restraint begins
with the premise that certain applications of the Constitution to conduct
formerly regulated by the state legislatures open a Pandora’s box of judicial
intervention such that the Court must continually intervene to address the
myriad of issues that subsequently arise as a by-product of its initial
intervention.
In this scenario, the Court is left with three choices: (1) try to close the
box, (2) grapple indefinitely with the vast permutations of its original
intervention and continue to regulate state legislatures and their legislative
schemes on a case-by-case basis as issues happen to reach the Court, or (3)
remove the box altogether (and completely prohibit the states from
engaging in that area).
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Closing the box, although advocated by Justice Scalia in the death
penalty context, 278 is often a near-impossibility. Once the Court has
engaged in regulating a particular area under the Constitution, it is difficult
to go back, particularly given its traditional application of the principle of
stare decisis. 279 This becomes even more true the longer the Court
continues to apply the constitutional provision, as its general application
becomes more settled and often more accepted.
Continuing to apply the constitutional provision in a case-by-case
basis, no matter how tortured the jurisprudence, has been the traditional
practice of the Court. It has always seemed willing to give the states
another try and allow state legislatures to remedy the latest constitutional
flaw. 280
Death, however, is different. 281 While speech, freedom from search
and seizure, and voting are important constitutional rights, the deprivation
of one’s life is a far more serious proposition. As the Supreme Court has
repeatedly noted, “[t]here is no question that death as a punishment is
unique in its severity and irrevocability.”282 Thus, the consequence of
relying on a case-by-case approach to address constitutional problems is
that innocent individuals may be executed by the states.
Death is also different in the sense that capital trials tend to be full of
error. According to one recent study, almost seventy percent of capital
cases involve at least one serious, reversible error. 283 Ironically, despite all
of the Court’s constitutional regulation of the death penalty, the problems
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(2005).
279
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (explaining the factors to
consider when applying stare decisis).
280
See Josh Blackman & Ilya Shapiro, Keeping Pandora’s Box Sealed, 8 GEO. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 1 (2010) (discussing the Pandora’s box analogy in regards to the Privileges and
Immunities Clause and McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010)).
281
See e.g., Abramson, supra note 182; Rachel Barkow, The Court of Life and Death:
The Two Tracks of Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH.
L. REV. 1145 (2009). I have recently argued that life without parole should be its own kind
of different. See William W. Berry III, More Different than Life, Less Different than Death,
71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1109 (2010).
282
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976); see also Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (death differs from life imprisonment because of its “finality”);
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 460 n.7 (1984) (“the death sentence is unique in its
severity and in its irrevocability . . . .”); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 616–17 (2002)
(Breyer, J., concurring) (as “death is not reversible,” DNA evidence that the convictions of
numerous persons on death row are unreliable is especially alarming).
283
See Liebman, supra note 268 (providing data concerning the type and frequency of
error in capital cases).

490

WILLIAM W. BERRY III

[Vol. 101

have only increased over time. 284 Continued doubts about the capital
system’s ability to avoid imprisoning innocent individuals285 and perhaps in
some cases, execute them, is perhaps the best evidence that the Furman
experiment has simply failed.
Thus, the second part of the Pandora’s box understanding of judicial
restraint, as applied to capital punishment, is that, given the ways in which
“death is different,” pulling the box off of the table is the inevitable
conclusion one reaches if one opens the box in the first place.
Justice Powell ultimately concluded that getting rid of the death
penalty was the only option after being unable to solve the problem raised
by McCleskey—that race will always unfairly influence who receives the
death penalty. 286 Throughout his jurisprudence, Justice Powell adhered to
the principle of judicial restraint, but in the end, concluded that the
Pandora’s box of capital punishment should be removed from the reach of
the states. 287
Justice Blackmun personally believed that the death penalty should be
abolished. 288 Several times during his tenure on the Supreme Court he
wrote that if he were a legislator he would cast his vote to strike down
capital punishment.289 Yet, during the early years of his career, Justice
Blackmun exercised judicial restraint and refrained from constitutionalizing
the issue of capital punishment. 290 Once Pandora’s box was open, however,
Justice Blackmun slowly began restricting the application of the death
penalty in certain circumstances. 291 Ultimately, at the end of his career, the
only remaining option was to remove the proverbial box of death penalty
jurisprudence and eliminate its existence entirely through abolition of the
death penalty. 292 In the end, for Justice Blackmun, all of the tinkering in the
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world by the Supreme Court could not correct the fundamental problems of
the administration of the death penalty. 293
Justice Stevens likewise sought for many years to solve the problems
raised by the administration of the death penalty by the various states. 294
He ultimately concluded, though, that despite all of the Court’s
intervention, the same fundamental errors and flaws still persisted.295 In the
end, for Justice Stevens, Justice White’s view in Furman—that the costs of
allowing capital punishment heavily outweighed any benefit it might
offer. 296
To constitutionalize the death penalty, then, sets one on a path toward
its abolition. As the Court’s jurisprudence has shown, the Eighth
Amendment is not, and never will be, an effective tool that can eliminate
the deep and fundamental problems with the capital systems adopted by the
states: the propensity for widespread error and the risk (and even
likelihood) of innocent individuals being executed.
Is the answer then to not constitutionalize it in the first place and allow
the state legislatures complete autonomy to implement their capital
systems? As Justice Scalia has argued, “[t]here is something to be said for
popular abolition of the death penalty; there is nothing to be said for its
incremental abolition by this Court.”297
Certainly not. As the Court explained in Furman, the historical
implementation of capital punishment has always been full of problems.
And as remains true today, “[t]hese death sentences are cruel and unusual in
the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual.” 298 As the
jurisprudence of Justices Powell, Blackmun, and Stevens can attest, the
error of the Court came not when it “opened the box” in Furman, but when
it allowed the box back on the table in Gregg.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to fill the void of a collective analysis of the
repudiation of capital punishment by Justices Powell, Blackmun, and
Stevens from their initial pro-death penalty positions. It has conceptualized
these parallel shifts not as normative changes, but from the perspective of
institutional choice.
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Thus, this repudiation is a story of abandoning judicial restraint at two
levels.
First, this Article explored the change at the level of
constitutionalizing the death penalty in the first place, and then at the level
of abolishing the death penalty altogether.
From this jurisprudence, the Article has argued that the conclusions of
each of the three Justices are the inevitable consequence of abandoning
judicial restraint because of the Pandora’s box nature of such constitutional
interpretation. The Article claims that, in the capital context, there are two
natural consequences of constitutionalizing capital punishment. First, the
initial decision to make the issue a constitutional one rather than one
exclusively regulated by state legislatures results in the creation of
numerous doctrinal and jurisprudential problems in the use of the death
penalty. As with other similar areas, the problem becomes magnified as the
Court tries to address these systemic issues one case at a time.
In the capital context, there is a second consequence of
constitutionalizing the death penalty. Based on the notion that “death is
different” and the high volume of error in capital cases, the inevitable
outcome of constitutionalizing capital punishment is the conclusion that
capital punishment should be abolished.
In sum, then, the Article has attempted to explore and explain the
dramatic shift in the capital jurisprudence of Justices Powell, Blackmun,
and Stevens. Perhaps their sentiments can best be summarized by the
Frenchman Marquis de Lafayette:
Till the infallibility of human judgments shall have been proved to me, I shall demand
299
the abolition of the penalty of death.
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